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1945 IN CROATIA
Zdenko RADELIĆ*
he author presents the basic contours of 1945, which was marked by 
the end of the war, the collapse of the Independent State of Croatia, the 
establishment of Federal State of Croatia as a component of Democratic 
Federal Yugoslavia and the seizure of authority by the Communist Party 
of Yugoslav (KPJ). Ater the end of a liberation and civil war, the KPJ took 
power into its hands and created the essential prerequisites for the federal 
reorganization of the Yugoslav state and the revolutionary change of society 
in compliance with its revolutionary and federalist ideas and through the 
application of experiences from the USSR. he emphasis is on the most 
important moves by the KPJ in the irst year of its rule and the fate of the 
main anti-communist forces in Croatia.
Key words: Croatia, 1945, he Communist Party of Yugoslavia
Introduction1
he year 1945 as mostly characterized by the end of the war, the collapse 
of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the establishment of the Federal 
State of Croatia (FDH) as part of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ). he 
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1 Most of the data and interpretations, and the references from this article can be found in 
my books: Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1945.-1950. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1996); 
Božidar Magovac: S Radićem između Mačeka i Hebranga (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest 
- Dom i svijet, 1999); Križari – gerila u Hrvatskoj : 1945.-1950. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za 
povijest - Dom i svijet, 2002 (Križari – gerila u Hrvatskoj: 1945.-1950., drugo izmijenjeno i 
dopunjeno izdanje, Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest – Alfa, 2011);Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 
1945.-1991. : Od zajedništva do razlaza(Zagreb: Školska knjiga – Hrvatski institut za povijest, 
2006) andSindikat i radništvo u Hrvatskoj (1945.-1950.)(Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 
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Communist Party of Yugoslavia/Communist Party of Croatia (KPJ/KPH) took 
power into his hands ater the liberation and civil war and created all essential 
prerequisites for the federal reorganization of the Yugoslav state and for the 
revolutionary change of society in compliance with Marxist doctrine and on 
the basis of the experiences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
the leading world state under communist rule.
At the beginning of 1945, the NDH permanently or intermittently con-
trolled a part of its territory, except Dalmatia, with the help of German troops, 
but many areas and smaller towns were either under the temporary control 
of or under siege by Partisan units which operated under the name People’s 
Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ), and as of March under the name Yu-
goslav Army (JA). Actually, the NDH generally only fully controlled cities, but 
not even the links between them. All of Dalmatia was under Partisan control, 
and JA units broke through the Srijem Front in eastern Croatia on 12 April 
1945. By 25 April, they entered Vukovar, Vinkovci, Osijek, Virovitica, Slavon-
ski Brod, Slavonska Požega and Nova Gradiška, and also Čakovec, while at 
the beginning of May they similarly entered Bjelovar and Koprivnica, Križevci 
and Ludbreg. In March, the JA took Udbina and Korenica, and then Gospić, 
Otočac, Slunj and Ogulin in early April. In the irst days of May, they also 
took Rijeka, Petrinja and Sisak. As the last remaining larger cities in Croatia, 
Karlovac and Varaždin were taken by the JA on 7 May, Zagreb was taken on 8 
May and then Krapina on 9 May 1945.2 However, even ater the end of the war, 
many links between individual parts of the country were uncertain due to the 
activities of the Crusaders (križari), adherents of the NDH, about whom more 
shall be stated below.
he leadership of the NDH did not want to surrender to JA forces, and in-
stead, compelled by the military losses of the German hird Reich, decided to 
seek support from the victorious Western powers, foreseeing their imminent 
conlict with the joint communist enemy under the leadership of the USSR. 
Just before the end of the war they abolished the racial laws which were a bar-
rier to cooperation with the Allies, and which made the NDH a component of 
the failed Nazi/Fascist system in Europe. hey sent the request for collabora-
tion and recognition to the Allies on 6 May, when a massive retreat of the state, 
political and military apparatus from Croatia also commenced, with the objec-
tive of surrendering to Anglo-American units in Austrian territory.
he creation of new state authority did not explicitly abolish the monarchy, 
nor were republics proclaimed, but the decisions of the Anti-fascist Council 
for the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) and the establishment of 
so-called territorial councils, such as the Territorial Anti-fascist Council of the 
People’s Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH), formed the state leadership of the 
2 Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije 1941-1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski in-
stitut, 1964).
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future federal units. In contrast to the revolutionary conclusions of AVNOJ, 
the new authorities soon established cooperation with the government of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. King Petar II Karađorđević was forced to form the 
Royal Regency on 29 January 1945, and on 2 March he appointed three re-
gents, a Croat, a Slovene and a Serb. he establishment of a joint government 
on 7 March 1945 created a transitional monarchical-republican government.3
Ustasha, Chetniks, Communists
One of the essential features of the war in the territory of Yugoslavia was 
the confrontation between domestic political and military movements that 
perceived the other movements which emerged within the framework of spe-
ciic nations and states as their greatest threats. he occupying powers and 
their military units were actually a secondary concern. Croatia entered 1945 
deeply divided. here were four major military and political groups: the KPJ 
at the head of the Partisan movement, the NDH under the leadership of the 
Ustasha movement, the remnants of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) with a 
largely passive membership divided between adherents of the former and new 
authorities, and the Chetnik movement, which advocated the restoration of 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
he organization of the Ustasha-Croatian Liberation Movement consisted 
of militant and radical nationalists with a traditionalist bent. he most notable 
features of the Ustasha organization were the cult of the Croatian state, anti-
Yugoslavism, anti-Serbianism and anti-communism. he Ustasha managed 
to form the NDH on the ruins of Yugoslavia with the assistance of the Axis 
powers. hey exploited German and Italian imperialist aspirations, as well as 
the aspiration of a large part of the Croatian people for state independence, 
to proclaim a Croatian state ater the collapse of Yugoslavia. he crucial role 
of the German and Italian allies largely dictated the internal organization and 
international status of the NDH. Italy, with the assent of the NDH leadership, 
seized a large portion of Croatian territory, even though the Ustasha move-
ment considered it an inseparable part of the Croatian state. he primary ex-
pression of the alliance between the NDH and the hird Reich, besides the es-
tablishment of the NDH and warfare against all enemies of the Tripartite Pact, 
was ideological alignment with the National Socialists, particularly the racist 
persecution of the Roma and Jewish minorities. he Ustasha also enforced se-
vere measures against the Serbs, who they deemed the primary enemies of the 
Croatian state, and of whom a vast majority desired the renewal of Yugoslavia. 
3 Ferdo Čulinović, Stvaranje nove jugoslavenske države (Zagreb, 1959), pp. 58, 208, 221, 229, 
232, 244; Zasjedanje Privremene narodne skupštine.Belgrade 7. VIII-27.VIII 1945. (Split: Bibli-
oteka Slobodna Dalmacija, 1945), p. 41.
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hrough the discrimination and persecution against the Serbs, the Ustasha 
sought to bring long-term stability to the Croatian state. It would become ap-
parent over time that such policies were in fact one of the primary elements 
that caused the instability of the NDH.
Besides the communists, the other guerrilla formations that opposed the 
NDH and the occupying powers were adherents of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
Called the Chetniks, i.e., members of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland 
(JvuO), they were mostly advocates of centralism and Greater Serbian nation-
alism who wanted to restore the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. he government of 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia embraced them as its own army in the homeland, 
and they were also recognized by the Allies. he Chetniks drew their support 
almost exclusively from among the Serbs. Counting on the victory of the West-
ern Allies, they adopted tactics of waiting and loyal relations with the occupy-
ing powers, like many other governments in occupied Europe. he passivity 
of Chetnik units gradually transformed into cooperation with the occupying 
forces or the Ustasha regime. hey presented themselves as the defenders of 
Yugoslavia and the Serbian nation, and accused the Croats of betraying the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. hey formed ties with the Italians on the basis of a 
common interest: animosity against the Partisans, but also the Ustasha, al-
though they were not in an open military conlict with the latter.
he Partisan movement not only served the communists as a necessary 
means for the liberation struggle, but also to seize power and to initiate far-
reaching social change. his is why they systematically, albeit oten secretively, 
suppressed any form of pluralism. he national question was one of the es-
sential levers for launching a revolution, but its solution only consisted of a 
federalist form of state community, while relations between nations remained 
under the strict control of the KPJ without any possibility for the full advocacy 
of individuals or parties for narrower national interests vis-à-vis state institu-
tions. During the war and immediately thereater, the communists claimed 
that they were not ighting for their dictatorship and radical change, and that 
they would guarantee political pluralism and private property, calling for na-
tional liberation and people’s democracy. hey invited the members of other 
parties to join their common struggle, but they retained a monopoly on lead-
ership of the Partisan movement, accusing the leadership of civic parties of 
national betrayal. In this process, they also exploited lower-ranking oicials of 
such parties, according to them the new status of high party representatives. In 
Croatia they helped establish a new leadership of the supposed Croatian Peas-
ant Party (HSS), renamed the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS) as of 
June of that year, consisting of the party’s lower-ranking oicials. he commu-
nists used this new leadership, which separated from the party and its presi-
dent Vladko Maček, as a means to create the mass character of the Partisan 
movement and the People’s Front (NF), to eject the previous party leadership 
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and, ultimately, to build a communist dictatorship.4 his will be elaborated in 
greater detail in the following section.
Although there are no entirely reliable data, according to estimates there 
were approximately 170,000 members of the armed forces of the NDH in both 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. About 15,000 Croats who were serving in 
the legionary units of the German army and gendarmerie, about whom there 
are no dependable data, should be added to this number. At the end of the war, 
many members of the NDH armed forces emigrated, w others were executed, 
while the survivors were entirely socially marginalized. In contrast to them, 
the 203,834 Partisans in Croatia experienced a considerably enhanced social 
status.5 According to the data released by the UDBa (Yugoslav security ser-
vice) in 1952, there were 94,000 political emigrants who let had Yugoslavia, of 
whom 30,000 or 32% were Croats.6 To be sure, most had emigrated in 1945. As 
to the number of Chetniks in Croatia, there are no certain data on them, either. 
In the relevant sources, it was mentioned there were approximately 3,000 of 
them in 1945. However, given that they oten intermingled with Chetniks from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as those who came from the territory of Monte-
negro and Serbia, their number in the territory of Croatia was considerably 
higher. Research for the entire territory of the NDH is somewhat more reliable, 
and according to it there were approximately 35,000 Chetniks originally from 
the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.7
In summary, the outbreak of war and the mass recruitment into one of 
these movements in Croatia’s territory was mostly inluenced by the Ustasha 
4 Zdenko Radelić, Božidar Magovac, S Radićem između Mačeka i Hebranga.
5 Vojna enciklopedija, Drugo izdanje, 2, Brdo-Foa, “Domobranstvo” (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački 
zavod, 1971), pp. 517-520, 518; Vojna enciklopedija, Drugo izdanje, 6., Nauloh-Podvodni, “Oku-
pacija Jugoslavije 1941-1945”, (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1973), pp. 361-375, 373; Dušan 
Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999), pp. 129, 130, 141, 171; 
Velimir Ivetić, “Srbi u antifašističkoj borbi na područjima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-
1945. godine”, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, (1995), no. 1: 149-175, 152-167. Z. Dizdar claimed that 
there were 200,000 members in 1945. See: Zdravko Dizdar, “Brojitbeni pokazatelji vojničkih 
postrojbi na teritoriju Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941. – 1945. godine”, Časopis za suvremenu 
povijest, (1996), no. 1–2: 161-197, 197. Davor Marijan asserted that at the end of the NDH, all 
of its armed forces combined had roughly 110,000 members. See: Davor Marijan, Ustaške vojne 
postrojbe 1941. – 1945., Magistarski rad, (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Filozofski fakultet, pp. 
73-76).
6 Katarina Spehnjak, “Većeslav Holjevac u političkim događajima u Hrvatskoj 1967. godine”, 
Časopis za suvremenu povijest, (2000), no. 3: 567-594, 568; Položaj i delatnost jugoslovenske 
političke emigracije u 1952 godini (Belgrade, 1953), p. 5. 
7 Bogdan Krizman, ed., Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1941-1943, Dokumenti (Zagreb: 
Arhiv Jugoslavije – Globus, 1981), p. 36; Mladen Colić, “Kolaboracionističke oružane formacije 
u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945. godine” u: Oslobodilačka borba naroda Jugoslavije, knjiga 2. (Belgrade, 
1977), pp. 75-76; Ivetić, “Srbi u antifašističkoj borbi na područjima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 
1941-1945.godine”, pp. 162, 165; Dizdar, “Brojitbeni pokazatelji vojničkih postrojbi na teritoriju 
Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941. – 1945. godine”, pp. 187, 192.
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terror against Serbs, the Serbian rejection of the Croatian state and the desire 
for Yugoslavia’s restoration, anti-Italian sentiment in the regions occupied by 
the Kingdom of Italy or under its control and the revolutionary intent of the 
KPJ.
Croatian Peasant Party
he leadership of the HSS rejected cooperation with the Ustasha authori-
ties. hey were counting on an Allied victory, ater which the party could con-
tinue its work in a possibly expanded and reinforced Banovina of Croatia in 
a restored Kingdom of Yugoslavia.8 he party maintained an equal distance 
from the Partisan movement, assessing that the KPJ would exploit the libera-
tion struggle for a communist revolution. However, in a manner similar to the 
Ustasha movement, the KPJ attracted a high number of HSS members to its 
side, i.e., to the Partisans, by underscoring the similarities in the platform of 
the HSS and the proclaimed program of the Uniied People’s Liberation Front 
(JNOF). With the help of lower-level party functionaries, they accused Maček 
of treason, and they attempted to gradually impose a new leadership on the 
party, with whose help the KPJ could use the HSS to waylay criticism that the 
Partisans wanted to implement a communist revolution. hose members of the 
party who wanted to join the Partisans and thereby renounce the leadership of 
the HSS, and thus the party itself, formed the Executive Committee (IO) of the 
HSS, which was renamed the IO HRSS (Croatian Republican Peasant Party) in 
June 1945, presenting themselves as the genuine leadership of the HSS.
hroughout the war, and even in 1945, HSS leader Vladko Maček had been 
under the strict supervision of the Ustasha. In order to avoid the fate of Au-
gustin Košutić, the party’s deputy chairman, who had been detained by the 
Partisans, and also due to articles printed in Vjesnik, the bulletin of the Uniied 
People’s Front of Croatia, which accused him of betraying the people, Maček 
emigrated. He sent secret messages from abroad to members of the HSS lead-
ership who had remained in Croatia, telling them not to participate in the 
elections for the Constitutional Assembly in November 1945. He warned that 
this would signify recognition of the legitimacy of the communist authorities. 
In an interview for he New York Times published on 23 July 1945, he stressed 
that a communist dictatorship was ruling Yugoslavia. He thereby rejected the 
policies of Šubašić and Šutej, members of the communist-royal Yugoslav coali-
tion government headed by Josip Broz Tito.9
8 Ljubo Boban, Kontroverze iz povijesti Jugoslavije, 1. i 2. (Zagreb: Stvarnost - Školska knjiga, 
1989); Fikreta Jelić Butić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka (Zagreb: Globus, 1983); Radelić, Hrvatska 
seljačka stranka1941. – 1950.
9 “Put Mačeka – put izdaje”, Vjesnik, 26. 2. 1944; “Svim pristašama Hrvatske Seljačke stranke”, 
Slobodni dom, 8. 3. 1944; “Maček prorokuje diktaturu Tita. Izjavljuje da je u Jugoslaviji 
komunistički režim siguran, ali Hrvati će se tome oduprijeti“, New York Times, 23. 7. 1945., 
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Ater the unsuccessful Vokić-Lorković putsch, August Košutić wanted to 
negotiate with the communists. However, the Partisan leadership put him in 
coninement at the end of 1944, ater he arrived among the Partisans. Even 
ater the war, Košutić was kept in detention. However, through his wife Mira 
Košutić, the daughter of HSS founder Stjepan Radić, who had been visiting 
him in prison, and through the HSS party bulletin Narodni glas, he still guided 
the party’s policies. Like Maček, he opposed the legalization of the party and 
participation in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly of Yugoslavia.10
Earlier in 1944, the communists had also interned Božidar Magovac, a re-
spected member of the HSS, a Partisan and the deputy chairman of the Peo-
ple’s Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (NKOJ), for reasons similar 
to those that led to Košutić’s detainment. Namely, Magovac had attempted to 
impose the HSS Executive Committee on the communists as an equal partner.
As opposed to Magovac and Košutić, Ivan Šubašić, the former ban (royal 
governor) of the Banovina of Croatia, and the prime minister of the Yugoslav 
royal government, became the foreign minister in the communist-royal coali-
tion government on 7 March 1945. He intended to continue his collabora-
tion with the communists within the People’s Front of Yugoslavia (NFJ), which 
was then supposed to be joined by the uniied HSS and HRSS. In contrast to 
Šubašić, Juraj Šutej, also a notable HSS party activist and a member of the in-
terim government, insisted on resignations and an independent campaign by 
the HSS outside of the NFJ.11
Human casualties and loss of property in Croatia
he year 1945 and the ensuing period were notoriously marked by hu-
man casualties and physical destruction. According to some research, a total of 
295,000 persons were killed in Croatia, of whom 137,000 were Serbs, 118,000 
Croats, 15,000 Roma and 16,00 Jews. In the case of the latter, 6,000 were killed 
or died abroad. his is a total of 7% of Croatia’s population, and 3.6% of the 
Croats and as many as 17.3% of the Croatian Serbs.12
Casualties among the population continued to mount even ater the war. 
Mass executions of Ustasha and Home Guardsmen (domobrani) were per-
formed pursuant to commands issued by the communist and Partisan lead-
ership. he chief of the security service (People’s Protection Department – 
prema: Dinko Šuljak, Tražio sam Radićevu Hrvatsku (Barcelona – München: Knjižnica Hrvatske 
revije, 1988), p. 409.
10 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 28.
11 Ibid.
12 Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga: Gubici stanovništva 
Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), pp. 159-170.
Z. RADELIĆ, 1945 In Croatia
16
OZNa), Aleksandar Ranković, doubtlessly in agreement with Josip Broz Tito, 
the chairman of the NKOJ, the KPJ general secretary and supreme commander 
of the Yugoslav Army, implemented a radical policy of retaliation against all 
enemies when, on 17 May 1945, he demanded a greater resoluteness from the 
Croatian branch of the OZNa which had, obviously, been agreed to earlier.
“Over 10 days, only 200 bandits have been shot in liberated Zagreb. We are 
surprised by this indecisiveness for cleaning Zgb. of villains. You are defying 
our orders, for we told you to act rapidly and energetically and to get every-
thing done in the irst few days.”13
hus, the instruction from the Yugoslav Army’s third OZNa section issued 
on 6 May 1945 to subordinate OZNa functionaries in military divisions stipu-
lates that prisoners held by the brigades were to be “liquidated on the spot”, 
and that if they did not have time due to military operations, the prisoners 
could be sent to the divisions where they would be “purged”. he instruction 
is clear:
“he stance on captured oicers and prisoners complies with earlier instruc-
tions. Oicers are to be purged without exception, unless you receive noti-
ication from the OZNa or Party that an individual is not be liquidated. In 
general, no mercy is to be shown in purges and liquidation”.14
Some lists of persons executed summarily or based on court rulings af-
ter the Partisans occupied a given area are available. hey were compiled by 
the OZNa district authorities in April and May of 1948. hese are lists from 
the districts and cities of Benkovac, Brač, Dubrovnik, Imotski, Makarska, Sinj, 
Šibenik and Zadar. It is entirely certain that such lists also had to have been 
compiled by the OZNa authorities in other Dalmatian districts and cities, but 
these have not been preserved, at least not in Croatian archives. It is quite likely 
that similar lists were compiled by the local OZNa oicials in other parts of 
Croatia, and in the rest of Yugoslavia as well.15
According to all previous assessments, the Yugoslav communist authorities 
organized mass executions of approximately 50,000 captured members of the 
NDH armed forces.16 Besides executions, the new authorities also organized 
trials. Based on preserved rulings, mainly from the period running from June 
13 Mate Rupić, ed., Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. Doku-
menti (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest-Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i 
Baranje, 2005), p. 263.
14 Mitja Ferenc, “(Zle) Huda jama: Zločin u radarskom oknu Barbara rov u Hudoj jami kod 
Laškog”, Hereticus, (2011), no. 1-2: 37-53, 49.
15 Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. : Dokumenti : Dalmaci-
ja, pp. 802-928.
16 Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga, p. 77; Dragutin Pelikan, “Mas-
ovna grobišta na području Hrvatske”, Politički zatvorenik,(2004), no. 143: 23-24; Ibid., no. 144: 
8-10; Ibid., no. 145: 30-32; Ibid., no. 146: 20-22; Mirko Valentić, ed., Spomenica povodom 50-te 
obljetnice Bleiburga i Križnog puta: 1945-1995 (Zagreb: Quo vadis, 1995).
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to August 1945, it may be concluded that in Croatia courts martial convicted 
nearly 5,200 individuals, and of them over 1,500 were sentenced to death.17 
Sentencing was based on the personal accountability of individuals, but also 
due to membership in an enemy military or movement. Besides retribution, 
the high number of those killed was also inluenced by the planned confron-
tation with potential military and political adversaries of the KPJ, Yugoslavia 
and the revolution. hus, the mass execution of captives was the result of sev-
eral essential causes: retaliation against military opponents who had caused 
casualties among the Partisans and their sympathizers; the decision to entirely 
block the restoration of hostile armies which could have threatened the recon-
struction of the Yugoslav state and the KPJ’s revolutionary objectives. Besides 
drastically reducing the number of potential military adversaries, this method 
also reduced the number of political opponents of the communist dictatorship, 
especially with regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections in the autumn 
of 1945. Retaliation, a customary feature of many wars, was transformed into 
state terror in Yugoslavia and Croatia. It did not only encompass members 
of the NDH state apparatus, Ustasha, Chetniks, Nazis and Fascists and the 
wealthy, but also, in Slavonia and Istria for example, Germans and Italians in 
general. Retaliations based on national intolerance between the Croats and 
Serbs was diicult to oversee, so at places the identiication of Croats as Usta-
sha across the board moved beyond the state’s control and the declared policy 
of fraternity and equality. here were many examples of abuses to further per-
sonal aims, such as the seizure of property and the eviction of entire fami-
lies from houses and apartments. Briely, retaliations were driven by wartime, 
revolutionary, ethnic and personal motives.
Major demographic changes in Croatia were also caused by the emigration 
or expulsion of members of the German and Italian minorities, mostly from 
Slavonia and Istria. he Germans were proclaimed guilty on a collective basis. 
heir property was coniscated and their other ethnic and civil rights were de-
prived. he basis for such actions was the “Decision on the Transfer of Enemy 
Assets to State Ownership, State Management of Assets of Absent Individu-
als and the Sequester of Assets Forcefully Expropriated by the Occupying Au-
thorities” made by the AVNOJ Presidium on 21 November 1944. he decision 
encompassed Germans, the so-called Volksdeutscher, with the exception of 
participants in the Partisan movement. Yugoslavia expelled the Volksdeutsche, 
and simultaneously prohibited the return of those who had led or had been 
expelled previously.18
17 Kaja Pereković, “Pogled unatrag: Pismo Andriji Hebrangu”, Politički zatvorenik, 2000, 102, 
pp. 21-23; Nada Kisić Kolanović, Hebrang. Iluzije i otrežnjenja (Zagreb: Institut za suvremenu 
povijest, 1996), pp. 146-148; Josip Jurčević, Represivnost jugoslavenskog sustava u Hrvatskoj 
1945. godine, Disertacija, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Filozofski fakultet (Zagreb: 2000), p. 407.
18 Službeni list Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 6. veljače 1945., 2., 13-14; 
Vladimir Geiger, Josip Broz Tito i ratni zločini : Bleiburg – Folksdojčeri (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut 
za povijest, 2013), pp. 31-50.
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hese expulsions were aligned with the practices introduced by the victori-
ous powers. At the Potsdam Conference held from 17 July to 2 August 1945, 
it was concluded that the remaining German populations in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland were to be relocated into Germany. Yugoslavia was not 
mentioned, but its authorities followed the example of their allies. A step far-
ther was the Citizenship Act adopted on 23 August 1945, which stipulated that 
citizenship could be stripped from any member of those peoples whose states 
were at war with Yugoslavia, if their citizen demonstrated disloyalty to Yugo-
slavia. hese sanctions also extended to spouses and children, if they could not 
prove that they had no ties to the culpable individual or if they were members 
of one of the peoples of Yugoslavia. However, the Allies had already closed 
their borders in the summer of 1945 and ceased admitting transports carrying 
Yugoslav Germans. So Yugoslavia then interned the Germans in camps. here 
are no precise data for Croatia, but according to the Internal Afairs Minis-
try of the People’s Government of Croatia, approximately 11,000 Germans 
had been accommodated in camps in Slavonia at the end of October 1945, of 
whom many later died. Approximately 90,000 Germans in all were deported 
from Croatia.19
he Italian minority endured less severe treatment than the Germans, even 
though they were also subjected to mass deportations. Besides the unresolved 
state/legal status of Istria and its uniication with Croatia and Yugoslavia and 
changes in the socio-political order, it is important to also note the impact of 
retaliations by the authorities against Fascists, the wealthy, intellectuals and 
Italians in general. hus, retaliations against the Italians were also motivated 
by wartime, revolutionary and ethnic reasons.20
Besides wartime casualties, demographic losses and mass deportations, the 
total population of Croatia immediately ater the war was also inluenced by 
colonization, which was launched as a part of the agrarian reforms of 1945.21
Croatia also sustained immense physical damage. About 400,000 people 
were let without their homes; 2.5 million head of livestock had been killed. 
Approximately 1,787 industrial and mining facilities had been destroyed or 
damaged. Only 16% of all railroads were suitable for traic. Over 90% of river-
ine or maritime vessels had been sunken or taken away.22
19 Geiger, Josip Broz Tito i ratni zločini : Bleiburg – Folksdojčeri, pp. 31-50.
20 Berto Črnja, Zbogom drugovi (Rijeka: Matica hrvatska, 1992), p. 65.
21 Stanko Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena (Zagreb: Ekonomski insti-
tut u Zagrebu, 1989), pp. 110, 118.
22 Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, 5, Hrv-Janj, “Hrvatska”, 1988., 153-435, p. 373;Drugi kongres 
Komunističke partije Hrvatske (Zagreb: 1949.) p. 79; Yugoslavia, East-Central Europe Under the 
Communists, ur. Robert F. Byrnes (New York - London, Mid-European Studies Center of the 
Free Europe Committee, Inc., Atlantis Books, bez g. izd.), pp. 405, 408.
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Complete domination by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
From the very beginning of the war, the KPJ took steps which revealed its 
revolutionary intentions, such as adopting symbols like the red star and ham-
mer and sickle, establishing proletarian brigades and introducing communist 
commissars to Partisan units, and also establishing people’s liberation commit-
tees (known as NOOs) as bodies of the new governing authorities. he KPJ did 
not literally implement the Leninist precept on the two stages of taking power, 
whereby the liberation stage of the struggle should have been followed by the 
revolutionary stage, rather these two ran parallel to each other.23
Later developments showed that all of the opponents of the communists, 
both real and potential, were tried for treason, and not as class enemies. Un-
der extrajudiciary decisions and court rulings, they were deprived of not only 
their lives and freedom, but also their property. he communist leadership 
persistently concealed its revolutionary activity with public declarations ad-
vocating democratic principles. Such were the “Declaration of the Supreme 
Command of the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yu-
goslavia (VŠ NOV and POJ) and the Antifascist Council of the People’s Libera-
tion of Yugoslavia” of 8 February 1943, and the “Declaration on the Objectives 
and Principles of the People’s Liberation Struggle of the Steering Committee 
of the Territorial Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Croatia, the 
High Command of the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of 
Croatia (GŠ NOV and POH)” of 26 June 1943, as well as the “Declaration of 
the Chairman of the NKOJ Josip Broz Tito” of 17 August 1944.24 he victors 
not only classiied “openly Quisling groups” among the vanquished, but also 
“other reactionary groups”. Edvard Kardelj wrote about this in October 1944.25
Given the inluence of the Western powers, especially Great Britain, but 
also the unease among the population over revolutionary undertakings, even 
ater its military victory, the KPJ operated within the NFJ and did not pub-
licly function under its own name. Additionally, the communists, cognizant 
of their shortcomings caused by their unqualiied personnel, wanted to take 
over all essential posts in the state apparatus and economy before openly op-
erating without the cover of democratic rhetoric. his is why they insisted on 
maintaining the pretence of parliamentary democracy in 1945. In the mean-
time, besides their open adversaries, their potential enemies had also become 
23 Ferdo Čulinović, Stvaranje nove jugoslavenske države, pp. 78, 80, 81, 94; Rasim Hurem, Kriza 
Narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta u Bosni i Hercegovini krajem 1941.i početkom 1942. godine (Sa-
rajevo: Svjetlost, 1972), pp. 90, 99, 101; Aleksander Bajt, Bermanov dosje (Ljubljana: Založba 
Mladinska knjiga, 1999), pp. 883, 895.
24 Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske, Zbornik dokumenata 1943.(Za-
greb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1964), p. 132; Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević, 
Jugoslovenski federalizam.Ideje i stvarnost, 1943 – 1986, 2 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1987), p. 72.
25 Edvard Kardelj, Put nove Jugoslavije (Belgrade – Zagreb: Kultura, 1946), pp. 398-402.
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weaker, and the KPJ’s position was further enhanced by the earlier elimination 
of oicials of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia who had been persecuted or margin-
alized in the NDH, as well as the Jews, who generally belonged to the wealthier 
class of the population. Moreover, the KPJ’s position was also strengthened 
by the deportation of the Germans during and immediately ater the war and 
their coninement to camps, the expropriation of industries, stores and large 
estates from their owners through a series of court rulings motivated by politi-
cal reasons due to alleged national treason, but actually based on concealed 
revolutionary aims, as well as the monetary and agrarian reforms.
hus, as already emphasized, in 1945 the KPJ implemented a furtive rev-
olution, and this continued until 1947 and 1948, when it was implemented 
openly. Besides those who would have been convicted by any court due to their 
crimes, many communist opponents, rivals and wealthier citizens were con-
victed due to alleged collaboration with the occupying powers and the NDH. 
he communist authorities organized orchestrated trials with the help of the 
tribunals for the protection of national honour, courts marital and civilian 
courts. Virtually every conviction was accompanied by – as noted – the con-
iscation of assets and the revocation of voting rights.26 hus, besides military 
criminals, so-called enemies of the people were also targeted, as they had to 
be socially marginalized. hey thereby created more favourable conditions for 
victory in local elections and in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly. 
In summary, besides those who were convicted due to actual culpability for 
war crimes or collaboration with the enemy, many were punished according 
to the revolutionary criteria of the KPJ and under the accusation that they had 
betrayed national or state interests.
he KPJ was a rigidly centralized party. he higher party bodies controlled 
all essential decision-making levers, including the election of members to 
lower bodies.27 he conspiratorial work methods were retained even ater the 
war. he public could not know who the members were, and who the leaders. 
Meetings were secret. For example, Marijan Cvetković, a member of the Local 
Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (KPH) in Zagreb, at a meeting 
of this organization on 11 August 1945, warned that many Party members are 
“publicly known”, which was deemed “impermissible”.28 Socialism and com-
munism were not mentioned in public party documents. Only terms such as 
people’s government and people’s democracy appeared.
At the beginning of 1945, the KPH had approximately 16,000 members, 
and together with members in military units stationed in Croatia, in January 
26 Milko Mikola, Sodni procesi na Celjskem 1944-1951 (Celje: Zgodovinski arhiv v Celju, 1995), 
p. 32.
27 Yugoslavia, East-Central Europe Under the Communists, 123.
28 Katarina Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda.Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945.–
1952.(Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002), p. 30.
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1945 there were 26,000 members. he young communists, members of the Al-
liance of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ), of whom there were 40,000 
at the beginning of 1945, should also be added to this number. Already in De-
cember 1945, the KPH had approximately 42,000 members, 11,000 candidates 
for membership and 60,000 youth activists.29 Even though the KPJ was deined 
as a workers’ party, based on the social composition of the KPH in early 1945, 
the 16,000 members consisted of 65% peasants, 23% labourers, 5% intellectu-
als, 4% civil servants and 3% cratsmen.30
Ater the demobilization in July and August 1945, according to various 
data, there were 70,000 to 100,000 members of the Communist Party and 
100,000 members of the SKOJ in the Yugoslav Army.31 Almost all members 
of the People’s Protection Department (OZNa), the Yugoslav intelligence and 
security service, which was at the forefront of the struggle against political op-
position, were members of the Communist Party.
Formal compromises of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
Josip Broz Tito, contrary to the decisions made by AVNOJ, which toppled 
the legitimacy of the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, acceded to 
the establishment of a joint government consisting of members of the Partisan 
National Committee for Yugoslavia’s Liberation (NKOJ) and the royal govern-
ment led by Ivan Šubašić on 7 March 1945, as well as royal regents, the expan-
sion of the AVNOJ and elections three months ater the war. he KPJ agreed 
to the introduction of democratic rights, but in practice these rights were little 
more than a formality.
However, King Petar II Karađorđević did not concede. He recalled the re-
gents on 8 August 1945 ater Tito’s declaration made at the 1st Congress of the 
People’s Front of Yugoslavia that a monarchy was not possible in Democratic 
Federal Yugoslavia because it was incompatible with a federation, people’s gov-
ernment and democracy and that the People’s Front would ight for a republic. 
29 Dokumenti Centralnih organa KPJ.NOR i revolucija (1941-1945), knjiga 22, (1. januar-4. mart 
1945.), prir. Branko Vuković (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1996), pp. 159, 280, 326; Zapisnici sa 
sednica Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945-7. jul 1948), ed. Branko Petranović 
(Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, Službeni list SRJ, 1995), p. 110; Ivan Jelić, Komunistička partija Hr-
vatske 1937-1945, 2 (Zagreb: Globus, 1981), pp. 329-333; Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 
pp. 129, 247.
30 Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937-1945, p. 332.
31 V. kongres Komunističke partije Jugoslavije. 21. – 28. jula 1948., Stenografske bilješke (Za-
greb: Kultura, 1949), p. 163; Drago Nikolić, Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945. – 1985. Kadrovi i 
kadrovska politika (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1989), pp. 19, 23, 40; Bilandžić, 
Hrvatska moderna povijest, p. 214; Yugoslavia, East-Central Europe Under the Communists, 
p. 159; Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, 6, Jap-Kat, “Jugoslavenska (Jugoslovenska) narodna armija“, 
1986., 144-156, p. 152.
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he interim government proclaimed this act by the king invalid. he Inter-
im National Assembly (PNS), which held session from 7 to 26 August 1945, 
agreed to this without holding deliberations.32
he PNS was supposed to be the transitional representative body from the 
AVNOJ to the Constitutional Assembly. It was created by the expansion of 
AVNOJ with so-called uncompromised delegates of the pre-war National As-
sembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, the recommendations of the 
Crimea Conference on the expansion of the AVNOJ with uncompromised del-
egates from the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was modi-
ied. he AVNOJ was expanded with not only a certain number of pre-war 
delegates but also members of existing political parties and groups and dis-
tinguished public and cultural igures. For it was asserted that the National 
Assembly of 1938 was put into oice under undemocratic circumstances and 
most of its delegates had conducted themselves treasonously during the war. 
To be sure, the fundamental objective was to elect as many Communist Party 
sympathisers as possible.33
On behalf of the HSS, 26 delegates entered the Interim National Assem-
bly, which had 486 delegates; half of the HSS delegates belonged to the group 
around Šubašić, while the remaining half were nominated by the HRSS. If the 
prior members of AVNOJ from among the ranks of the HRSS are counted, 
Peasant Party members accounted for an disunited group of 37 members.34
Given the estimates by Western representatives that the KPJ would win up 
to 30% of the vote in free elections for the Constitutional Assembly, the KPJ 
accorded considerable attention to these elections. In the summer of 1945, the 
PNS enacted the National Delegate Election Act and the Voter Rolls Act. It 
was speciied that members of the military formations “of the occupiers and 
their domestic collaborators” who had “fought against the People’s Liberation 
Army, or the Yugoslav Army, or the armies of the allies of Yugoslavia” did not 
have the right to vote. At the same time, radical changes led an increase in 
the pre-war electorate on two occasions by incorporating soldiers, women and 
youths down to the age of 18. Yugoslav Army soldiers could vote regardless of 
their age, in the area in which they happened to be on election day, regardless 
of whether or not they were registered in the voter rolls.35 With these electoral 
laws, the authorities actually created a selection of preferred voters.
32 Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1988. godine (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988), p. 377; 
Zasjedanje Privremene narodne skupštine. Belgrade 7. VIII-27. VIII 1945., p. 41.
33 Zakonodavni rad Pretsedništva Antifašističkog veća narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije i 
Pretsedništva Privremene narodne skupštine DFJ, 19 novembra 1944 godine – 27 oktobra 1945 
godine (Belgrade: Prezidijum Narodne skupštine FNRJ, bez god. Izdanja), p. 555.
34 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 52.
35 Tvrtko Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik: Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene 
Američke Države 1945. – 1955. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa - Proil, 2003), pp. 34, 47; Spehn-
jak, Javnost i propaganda: Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945. – 1952., p. 128; 
Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1988. godine, p. 382; Jera Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 
1944-1946 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1992), p. 365.
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Based on the aforementioned laws, persons accused of collaborating with 
the occupying powers were erased from the voter rolls. In Croatia, sufrage 
could be revoked for anyone who had served in the armed forces of the NDH. 
According to the irst rulings in this vein, 7.38% of the voters were deleted in 
Croatia: most of them in the territory of Slavonski Brod and Osijek, while in 
the Bjelovar precinct as many 25% of the voters were deleted. Wary of poten-
tial accusations of undemocratic conduct, the authorities gradually reduced 
the number of persons with revoked sufrage. It was particularly sensitive to 
comparisons with Serbia, where such persons only accounted for 3%. In the 
end, 3.82% of the electorate in Croatia was deprived of the right to vote. his 
meant 69,109 of citizens out of a total of 2,034,628 voters. he Yugoslav aver-
age was 2.4%.36
However, considerable pressure from the authorities led opposition par-
ties to boycott the elections, including the HSS. he authorities responded 
by introducing boxes without slates or so-called black boxes. It was believed 
that this ensured democratic rules and the possibility of a secret ballot for vot-
ers. he elections were held on 11 November 1945. Since the authorities used 
threats to compel the population to turn out, those who did not turn out ex-
pressed their oppositional stance. To be sure, an unambiguous electoral stance 
was also expressed by those who dropped their balls into the boxes without 
slates. A low turnout was mostly recorded in northern Croatia. In the Varaždin 
precinct, 20% of the voters did not participate, while among those who did 
15% dropped their balls in the box without a slate; in the Bjelovar precinct 17% 
of the voters did not turn out, and there 15% also dropped their balls in the box 
without a slate; in the Daruvar precinct, 13% of the voters did not turn out.37
Table 1. Constitutional Assembly election results for Croatia, 194538
Voters
Federal assembly Assembly of peoples
Number % Number %
Registered 2,076,091 100 2,076,091 100
Voted 1,905,429 91.77 1,903,033 91.66
Did not vote 170,662 8.22 173,058 8.33
For People’s 
Front
1,743,797 91.52 1,698,417 89.25
For box 
without slate
161,632 8.48 204,616 10.75
36 Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda: Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945.–1952., p. 
131; Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, p. 220; Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, 
p. 344; Jože Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 – Nastanek, razvoj ter raspad Karadjordjevićeve in 
Titove Jugoslavije (Koper: Založba Lipa, 1995), p. 158.
37 Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda: Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945.–1952., p. 
132.
38 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 89.
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he People’s Front secured an absolute victory of approximately 90% of the 
votes out of the 90% of voters who turned out, so the National Assembly of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia relected the complete predominance 
of the communists. Out of the 534 members in the National Assembly in 1945, 
404 were members of the KPJ, while 120 were not. his means that 77% were 
KPJ members. here were a total of 111 Croatian delegates in the Constitu-
tional Assembly, of whom 70 were members of the KPJ, 32 were members of 
the HRSS, 3 were members of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition and 6 were 
non-party ailiated delegates.39 Out of the 25 members of the government of 
the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ), a large majority were com-
munists. he government was entitled to issue “decrees with the force of law”.40
However, the oicial results were dubious given the conditions in which 
the elections were conducted. he election campaign was entirely in the hands 
of the KPJ. he KPJ oversaw the trade unions, state-owned companies, the 
press and radio, and nominations. here were no opposition slates, nor alter-
native platforms. Additionally, the organization of polling stations, election 
commissions, the compilation of voter rolls and the counting of the vote were 
all in its hands. In many areas, people were compelled to vote by force, while 
the secrecy of the ballot was not guaranteed. he military and other represen-
tatives of the authorities threatened those who did not want to vote with the 
loss of their ration cards, pensions and housing. hey were threatened with 
prosecution, and even death. he boxes without slates were proclaimed “Usta-
sha boxes” or “black boxes”, and rumours circulated that it would be easy to 
determine how everyone had voted. Many boxes had narrow openings, so the 
falling of the rubber balls in them could be heard. here were also cases of 
moving the balls from the boxes without slates into the People’s Front boxes. At 
places where a suicient number of voters had not turned up by 7 p.m., the le-
gal deadline was extended as needed.41 Secrecy of the ballot was not respected. 
Many of those who voted for the black box became victims of state repression; 
they were, for example, assigned to engage in “various works”.42
According to Western diplomats, the elections were not “Western Euro-
pean in the sense of the word”. Despite such assessments, it would appear that a 
step further was even taken ater the assessment at the Potsdam Conference in 
August 1945 that Yugoslavia had violated the Declaration of Liberated Europe, 
39 Katarina Spehnjak, “Narodni front Hrvatske 1945. Godine”, in: Oslobođenje Hrvatske 1945, 
zbornik radova (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske, 1986), 324-337, p. 134.
40 Ustavotvorni sabor Narodne Republike Hrvatske. Stenografski zapisnici (28. 11. 1946. – 18. 1. 
1947.) (Zagreb: Sabor NRH, 1949), p. 279; Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 
225; Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1988. godine, p. 443.
41 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 90; HDA, CK SKH, Komisija za narodnu 
vlast CK KPH, Informacije o izborima za Sabor NR Hrvatske na kotaru Kostajnica.
42 HDA, CK SKH, Komisija za narodnu vlast CK KPH, Informacije o izborima za Sabor NR 
Hrvatske na kotaru Kostajnica.
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that there were no democratic authorities and agreements were not being hon-
oured, so the United States and Great Britain recognized the election results on 
22 December 1945. heir ambassadors even sent formally credentialed repre-
sentatives of their countries to Yugoslavia.43
Yugoslavia had moved from being a distinctly anti-Soviet country before 
the war to the trailblazer of communism in south-eastern Europe. However, 
already during the war the irst signs of conlict emerged with the communist 
centre in Moscow, which had reined in the revolutionary zeal of the Yugoslav 
communists. he USSR attempt to avoid heightening tensions with the West, 
which Yugoslavia neglected, attempting by all available means to extend its 
borders at the expense of Italy and Austria, to obtain Trieste and Carinthia. 
Conlicts with the West were also provoked by the seizure of foreign assets and 
interference in the civil war in Greece.44
he communists retained all of the formal contours of a parliamentary 
system. Actually, though, in 1945 the KPJ used formal procedures to preserve 
its dictatorship, which were only cemented by parliamentary means. he KPJ 
secured the support of the populace in two ways: voluntarily and coercively, 
but in any case successfully.
he Croatian Republican Peasant Party and Ivan Šubašić
Near the end of the war, Kardelj said that during the war the KPJ had 
“frontally” attacked other parties, but that now it was time to change tactics 
and engage in “diferentiation” among their members. However, both during 
and ater the war, various tactics were employed, from calls to cooperation to 
persecution of the members of other parties, which resulted in fractured par-
ties without uniied leadership and the disappearance of a genuine multi-party 
system. he communists were actually most afraid of uncompromised opposi-
tion politicians who could turn from allies into competitors. hey constantly 
warned of the danger of such individuals breaking the unity of the People’s 
Liberation Struggle, although they were actually concerned about the chal-
lenge to the KPJ’s predominance. Such politicians were welcomed during the 
war when it was necessary to get as much of the population as possible to sup-
43 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 91.
44 Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, p. 292; Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik, p. 
111; Hrvatski leksikon, 1. svezak, A-K, “Jugoslavija“, 1996., p. 549; Leonid Gibianskii, “Sovjetsko-
jugoslovenski sukob 1948: istoriografske verzije i novi arhivski izvori”, in: Jugoslavija v hladni 
vojni: Yugoslavia in the Cold War (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino – University of To-
ronto, 2004), pp. 27-47; Vladimir Đuro Degan, Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici : Ra-
zvitak njezine međunarodnopravne osobnosti tijekom povijesti (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 
2002), pp. 185, 186; Olivera Milosavljević, “Slika Zapada iz vizure komunističke i nacionalističke 
ideologije”, Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac, ed., Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, 6, Zagreb, 5. – 
7. listopada 2001. (Zagreb, 2002), 113-130, p. 123. 
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port the Partisans and when they had to operate under communist conditions, 
but as victory became imminent, they were rejected and treated as traitors.
he role allotted for the HRSS was to “pacify adversarial” peasants in Croa-
tia. Stated simply, the remains of the party, if it could even be called that, for it 
had been relegated to its leadership without legitimacy and without members, 
were supposed to prevent opposition activity. he executive committee of the 
HRSS under the leadership of Franjo Gaži, who took the place of Božidar Ma-
govac, participated in the government, but under the supervision of the KPJ 
and without public support. he KPJ transformed this body into an instru-
ment for breaking apart the HSS and destroying pluralism and the multi-party 
parliamentary system. At the same time, it served the communists as proof 
that there was in fact a multi-party scene and democracy. Ater playing its role 
in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly of 1945 and ater communist 
authority had been reinforced by the development of a repressive apparatus 
and full international recognition, the HRSS was gradually dissolved in the 
following years.
Šubašić wanted to unify the HSS and HRSS, but also for Maček to tender 
his resignation. he delegates of the HSS and HRSS were supposed to work 
together in the Interim National Assembly, and then the parties were to unite. 
Talks continued until September 1945. he HRSS executive committee, un-
der the direct inluence of the communists, was dismissive of the HSS leader-
ship. Actually, rather than uniication, it proposed that HSS members join the 
HRSS, and thus also the People’s Front. he KPJ and its people in the HRSS 
executive committee wanted to abolish the HSS, and put the HRSS in its place 
to become a mere section of the Communist Party for the Croatian peasantry.
Šubašić naturally thought of the NFJ as an “association of parties”. How-
ever, Tito, the general secretary of the KPJ, the president o f the NFJ, the prime 
minister and the commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav Army, explained to him 
that it would be an “association of individuals”. his meant only one thing: the 
melding of all parties into the People’s Front with the irmly organized KPJ 
at its head.45 Finally, Tito publicly warned that the old parties would not be 
renewed, even though he continued to refute accusations on the creation of a 
one-party system.46
Šubašić convened a conference of the top members of the HSS in the Ho-
tel Esplanade in Zagreb on 2 September 1945.47 He put three demands before 
the participants: that the HSS and HRSS unite, that a so-uniied HSS join the 
45 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 51.
46 Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški, Stranački pluralizam ili monizam (Ljubljana: Tribuna, 
posebna izdaja, 27 November 1987).
47 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., pp. 54-60; Zdenko Radelić, “Konferencija 
prvaka HSS-a u hotelu Esplanade u Zagrebu 1945.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, (1993), no. 
2-3: 25, 149-164.
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NFJ and that the party participate in the elections. However, most of them 
demanded that Šubašić and Šutej tender their resignations in the government 
and opposed campaigning together with the HRSS, let alone as part of the NFJ. 
hey demanded that HSS proceed as opposition party, particularly because 
Maček had emigrated and Košutić was being held in custody. Only a minor-
ity advocated cooperation with the NFJ. However, Šutej ofered a compromise 
and the conference adopted a conclusion according to which Šubašić was to 
visit Maček in Paris and to receive instructions from him. he British put an 
airplane at Šubašić’s disposal. However, on the day before his trip, on 10 Sep-
tember 1945, Deputy Prime Minister Kardelj notiied Šubašić that the authori-
ties would not permit him to leave the country. Šubašić sufered a stroke on 
that same evening.
Šubašić thus endured several severe blows in the course of a month or two: 
King Petar II Karađorđević rescinded the right of the regents to represent him, 
Deputy Prime Minister Milan Grol tendered his resignation, and the émigré 
leaders of the Serbian civic parties sent a memorandum to the Conference of 
Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945 in which they condemned 
the policies of the Yugoslav government. Additionally, the Episcopal Confer-
ence of Yugoslavia released a Pastoral Letter containing grave accusations of 
persecution of the Catholic Church. Let without anyone’s support, at Šutej’s 
prompting both he and Šubašić tendered their resignations on 8 October 1945.
here was no signiicant response from the US and Great Britain. hey 
feared that any stronger pressure on their part would have resulted in Yugo-
slavia completely joining the Soviet sphere of inluence, even though that had 
already happened. On 6 November 1945, they sent a note in which they ex-
pressed dismay over the violation of the Agreement. Ater the elections, on 17 
November 1945, a response arrived from Tito. He asserted that all points of the 
Agreement had been fulilled and that ater the resignations and the electoral 
victory of the People’s Front, “the Allied governments had been relieved of 
their obligations” toward the “Yugoslav people”.48
he Croatian Peasant Party: Narodni glas, Maček and Košutić
he KPJ did not want to release Košutić from jail, believing that he could 
revive the activities of the HSS, particularly ahead of the Constitutional As-
sembly in 1945 and the Constitutional Convention of 1946. Košutić’s release 
was made conditional upon his assent to tie the HSS to the NFJ or to withdraw 
from politics. Košutić did not concede to this ultimatum, demanding freedom 
to engage in party activism. He was thus remanded to two-year custody, and 
a trial had not yet been held. Mira Košutić, his wife and the daughter of Stj-
48 Željko Krušelj and Jera Vodušek Starič, eds., “Jugoslavija u britanskim izvještajima 1945-50”, 
Danas, May 23, 1989.
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epan Radić, carried out the policies of Košutić. She launched the party bulletin 
Narodni glas čovječnosti, pravice i slobode (People’s Voice of Humanity, Justice 
and Freedom). Her mother and Radić’s widow, Marija Radić was the publisher, 
while Ivan Bernardić was the editor in chief. In Croatia it was the only newspa-
per that was not under the regime’s control. he irst and sole issue of Narodni 
glas was printed on 20 October 1945.49
Narodni glas rejected the claim that Radić’s program had been achieved 
under the KPJ’s leadership. It referred to supporters of the HRSS as “heretics” 
and “truants”, alluding to their participation in the Partisan movement against 
the wishes of the party’s leadership. About Franjo Gaži, the chairman of the 
HRSS executive committee, it asserted he was installed at his post by the par-
ty’s master, meaning, of course, the KPJ. he HRSS was called the “peasant 
section of the communist party in Croatia”.
Narodni glas warned that the Constitutional Assembly would determine 
the constitutional status of Croatia, and that there would be no way to express 
the free will of the people, because the regime asserted that it would ight to 
protect the achievements of the war by all available means, including arms. 
However, Narodni glas pointed out that the actual act of liberation was the only 
achievement of the war, and that the Croats had experienced several libera-
tions over the preceding 25 years: by King Petar I Karađorđević, by the Croa-
tian fascists smuggled in from abroad (i.e., the Ustasha headed by Pavelić), 
then by the Serbian Chetniks under the leadership of Draža Mihailović, until 
all of them were pushed aside by the “people’s liberation movement” headed 
by the KPJ and Josip Broz Tito. It concluded that in Croatia “these liberations 
should inally come to an end”.
Narodni glas openly stated that the Communist Party had introduced a 
dictatorship and that it was persecuting its opponents under the pretence that 
they were fascists. By the same token, it stressed that there were no personal 
freedoms, no freedom of private ownership, and that the federal units, includ-
ing Croatia, had no actual authority. Warning that there would be no way to 
express the free will of the people in the elections for the Constitutional As-
sembly, it called on electoral abstinence.50
Distribution of the irst issue was banned under the accusation that it had 
berated the achievements of the National Liberation Struggle, provoking eth-
nic hatred and promoting the eforts of the enemy. Since Bernardić continued 
work on the second issue, the communist authorities pressured the printing 
press workers in order to prevent its publication. hus, according to Vjesnik, 
the employees of Narodna tiskara (the national printing press) in Zagreb re-
fused to print Narodni glas because it was “reactionary”. Ater communist youth 
49 Zdenko Radelić, “Narodni glas – glas oporbe 1945.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, (1994), 
no. 2: 299-315.
50 Ibid., 305.
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had already previously (on 22 August 1945) broken into Radić’s bookstore in 
Jurišićeva street in Zagreb – the gathering place of an HSS group around Mira 
Košutić – and shattered paintings of Radić and Maček, and then threw a bomb 
at the bookstore on 13 November 1945, further publication was halted.
For the HSS, a fundamental question was whether or not to register the 
party. he Associations, Unions and Other Public Groups Act of 25 August 
1945 stipulated that parties which intended to renew their activities had to reg-
ister. here were two methods for party registration: by issuing a statement on 
joining the NFJ or by submitting the party application, platform and charter to 
the internal afairs ministry.51
Given the conlicts in the party even ater the elections on 15 November 
1945, a new conference was convened in the Clergy Hall in Palmotićeva street 
in Zagreb on 15 November 1945. he participants were supposed to decide 
between whether or not to register the party. he majority supported the reg-
istration of the HSS, because legalization would have facilitated public activity. 
On the other hand, the authorities could equate the HSS with the Ustasha and 
Chetniks due to illegal activity.52 Opponents of legalization stressed that only 
Košutić and Maček could decide on matters of such import.53 Ultimately it was 
decided that deputy chairman Košutić should make a inal decision on this 
matter. Košutić soon sent a letter from jail in which he resolutely declared his 
opposition to registering the HSS.
Maček communicated with the HSS in the homeland by secret channels. 
he communist authorities oversaw all contacts with the HSS because people 
in the top rungs of the HSS were collaborating with the OZNa. hey were aware 
of the attempts of Juraj Šutej, Franjo Gaži and Tomo Jančiković to activate the 
party. hey were naturally also aware of Košutić’s views on the elections.
During the session of the Interim National Assembly in August 1945, 
many delegates of Yugoslav opposition parties advocated joint action. here 
were talks on cooperation between several parties, outside of the NFJ (Demo-
cratic Party, HRSS, HSS, People’s Peasant Party, Radical Party, Alliance of Farm 
Labourers, Slovenian People’s Party, Socialist Party). Such initiatives continued 
unsuccessfully in the ensuing years.54
51 Momčilo Pavlović, “Politički programi Demokratske, Narodne radikalne, Jugoslovenske re-
publikanske demokratske, Socijalističke i Socijal-demokratske stranke Jugoslavije iz 1945.go-
dine”, Istorija XX veka, 1 (1985): 119-155.
52 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., p. 96.
53 Ibid., p. 97.
54 Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka1941. – 1950., pp. 178-182; Zdenko Radelić, “Izvršni odbor 
Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke i njegovi otpadnici (1945. – 1948.)”, Časopis za suvre-
menu povijest, (1992), no. 2: 59-81, 64.
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he communists and religion
According to the ideological precepts of Marxism, religion was the prima-
ry ideological tool of exploiters in the struggle against the oppressed masses. 
he communist believed that in a multi-ethnic state, churches and religions 
created fertile ground for hatred among peoples. his is why the KPJ wanted to 
limit the inluence of religious organizations in the public sphere. It attempted 
to be the sole ideological and political authority, and atheism was, in a manner 
of speaking, the only religion that could fulil an integrative function. Since re-
ligion could not be subjected to bans, believers and the church were ostracized 
from public life, and their activity was subject to harsh restrictions.
he regime took into account the mood of the population, but also inter-
national circumstances. he Catholic Church exerted considerable inluence 
among the people, not only as a religious institution, but also as a public insti-
tution in the ields of education and charity work. his is why the communists 
applied methods against it that difered from their destruction of political par-
ties. Most oten they accused it of collaborating with the enemy authorities and 
of serving as an instrument of the class enemy which misused religious senti-
ment. he millennial policy of the Catholic Church under the slogan “Render 
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are 
God’s”, which was also implemented under the NDH, served as an impetus 
to ind reasons for its condemnation in the recently concluded war. he state 
justiied its attack on the Catholic Church based on its anti-communism, lack 
of autonomy from the Vatican and the Vatican’s support for Italy.55
Even though many priests had cooperated with the NDH regime due to 
the very nature of their work, or they had an ideological ainity for it, of-
ten they sufered precisely because they were an obstacle to the revolution’s 
ultimate aims. Oten they were killed in executions, a smaller number were 
killed in military operations, and quite rarely they were sentenced to death 
ater court trials. According to one analysis of slain priests, from the war to the 
end of 1945, a total of 330 Catholic priests were killed, and 206 were killed in 
1945 alone.56
One of the most important events which inluenced the relationship be-
tween the Catholic Church and the communist authorities was the Conference 
of Bishops held in Zagreb on 24 March 1945. It defended the right of the Croa-
tian people to their own state and condemned the numerous executions of 
priests. hey released the Epistle which accused the communists of engaging 
55 Ibid.:478, 479.
56 According to research conducted by Ivo Omrčanin. See: Stjepan Kožul, Martirologij crkve 
zagrebačke. Spomenica žrtvama ljubavi Zagrebačke nadbiskupije, Drugo i dopunjeno izdanje 
(Zagreb, 1998), p. 225.
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in terror, and justiied the role of the Catholic Church in the preceding period 
and, scarcely noticeable, distanced itself from the ruling regime in the NDH.57
Tito initially believed that he would settle relations with the Catholic 
Church. He insisted on its greater independence. He declared these thoughts 
on 2 June 1945 to representatives of the Catholic clergy in Zagreb. Ironically, 
Tito, an avowed internationalist, was advocating a national church. his absur-
dity was motivated by ideology and reasons of state and not, to be sure, nar-
row ethnic considerations.58 hese talks were held while Archbishop Alojzije 
Stepinac was imprisoned. Ater the bishops met with Tito, he was released. 
Already on 4 June, Stepinac met with Tito, but their conversation did not bear 
fruit. Soon Stepinac protested the arrest of many priests and he demanded an 
end to courts martial for civilians.59
he Conference of Bishops met in Zagreb from 17 to 22 September 1945. It 
released the Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops of Yugoslavia. he bishops 
levelled a series of grave accusations, and the most serious was that the new 
authorities had killed or imprisoned 501 priests (243 dead, 169 in prisons, 89 
missing; and additionally, 19 seminarians, 3 lay clerics and 4 nuns) during the 
war and immediately aterward. hey also called out the authorities for the 
manner in which trials were held, as the accused had no possibility of defend-
ing themselves by calling witnesses or being represented by attorneys. Out of 
the one hundred periodicals before the war, the letter emphasized, not one was 
being published any longer. he operation of Catholic printing presses was 
being prevented. Seminaries were seized by the army or requisitioned. Reli-
gious instruction in schools was no longer mandatory. he authorities were 
also criticized for the failure to respect private property, and because of the 
organization of entertainment for the youth without parental supervision. he 
communists accused the bishops of falsely portraying the situation and en-
couraging the Ustasha, i.e., the Crusaders, to continue engaging in terrorism.60
Persecution of the clergy intensiied, so that even the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Croatia had to restrain some communists. None-
theless, on 15 December 1945, Vladimir Bakarić announced a more radical 
“campaign against the priests”. At a consultative meeting of the secretaries of 
precinct committees of the Communist Party of Croatia in southern Croa-
tia on 20 December, it was reiterated that a campaign had been launched to 
“expose the clergy as nests of Ustasha”. he Catholic Church was also pro-
57 Ivan Mužić, Pavelić i Stepinac (Split: Logos, 1991), pp. 155-160.
58 Miroslav Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. 
do 1966. godine. Primjer zagrebačke nadbiskupije (Zagreb: Društvo za povjesnicu Zagrebačke 
nadbiskupije “Tkalčić”, 2003), pp. 17, 20; Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National 
Question (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 106.
59 Miroslav Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. 
do 1966. godine, p. 33.
60 Mužić, Pavelić i Stepinac, pp. 161-175.
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claimed an “agent of the imperialists”. One of the reasons for the campaign was 
concealed in the acknowledgement that the communists did not manage to 
sway the peasants, who lived in fear of communism.61 Trials against priests on 
charges of espionage, terrorism and other anti-state activities increased.
In the meantime, on 4 November 1945, Archbishop Stepinac was attacked 
in Zaprešić. At the same time, the OZNa was carrying out an operation to 
forge an order of a lag on behalf of an alleged Crusader group. he Crusader 
lag was intended for the Crusader group of Martin Mesarov at Bilogora, a for-
mer HSS delegate from Virovitica, which was under the OZNa’s control. he 
blessing of the lag in the archdiocesan chapel on 21 October 1945 was the pri-
mary evidence of collusion between the Zagreb archbishop and the Crusaders. 
he entire case was orchestrated by the OZNa, which engaged former Crusad-
ers and its own agents. he operation lasted from mid-1945 until December 
1945, when the OZNa had Mesarov killed.62 he accusations against Stepinac 
were tied to his secretary Ivan Šalić, while the communist regime went so far 
as to promote Stepinac as the leader of the Crusaders. his accusation was so 
absurd that it was not exploited in subsequent communist propaganda. he 
accusations pertaining to the Crusaders were based on the reception of the 
Ustasha Col. Erich Lisak in the Archbishop’s Palace as a guest, the receiving of 
letters from the Ustasha Col. Ante Moškov, the collection of medicine for the 
Crusaders and, inally, the blessing of a Crusader lag, in which Stepinac was 
not involved.
In a letter to Tito dated 24 December 1945, Stepinac clearly stated his view 
that the causes of the attack rested in the Communist Party’s stance on religion 
in general and that “therein lies the essence of today’s dispute between the 
Church and State”.63
Communist youth activists and Party members undertook various actions: 
they knocked down crosses, broke into parish rectories and attacked priests. 
Some faced criminal sanctions, others misdemeanour charges, and some were 
sanctioned by the Party; many, however, were not punished at all.64 he au-
thorities persistently denied any killings or attacks on priests, and quite signii-
cantly they always laid the blame on the priests. One of the rare acknowledge-
61 HDA, CK SKH, Savjetovanje sa sekretarima O. K. Gornje Hrvatske, 15. 12. 1945; HDA, CK 
SKH, inv. br. 307, Izvještaj CK KPH, 17. 3. 1946; HDA, CK SKH, Savjetovanje sa sekretarima 
Banije, Korduna, Like, Gorskog Kotara, Primorja i Dalmacije, 20. 12. 1945.
62 Zdenko Radelić, “Komunisti, križari i Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj 1945. – 1946. godine”, 
in: Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac, ed. Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, 2, Pečuh, 19. – 21. stu-
denoga 1999.(Zagreb, Friedrich Naumann Stitung, 2000), pp. 583-600; Lav Znidarčić, Alojzije 
Stepinac, O stotoj godišnjici rođenja, 2.izdanje (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1998), pp. 29, 71.
63 Radmila Radić, Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970., 1 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju 
Srbije, 2002), p. 268.
64 Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda: Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945.–1952., p. 
262.
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ments was made by Miko Tripalo, the secretary of the City Committee of the 
League of Communists of Croatia, but only in 1965, when during a consulta-
tive meeting on religious issues, he admitted that priests had been killed and 
that youth activists had planted explosives in churches.65
here was no state church in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but churches re-
tained certain state functions, such as the registration of births, marriages and 
deaths. Churches also operated certain primary and secondary schools, and 
religious instruction was mandatory in all schools. It was precisely due to this 
traditional relationship between the church and state that one of the more seri-
ous conlicts that arose between the new authorities and the Catholic Church 
was tied to the Marriage Act of April 1945. Mandatory civil marriages were 
introduced. Church marriages were relegated to the private sphere.66
Religious instruction was declared non-mandatory, so anyone who wanted 
such instruction had to apply for it. It was retained only in the lower grades of 
primary and secondary schools, but it was not graded. Prayer in schools was 
oicially eliminated, crosses were taken down, and joint school masses were 
also abolished. he state insisted that religious instruction was not to be held 
in churches, but only in schools, because “it could be controlled there”.67
he KPJ adopted a hostile stance toward all religious communities. How-
ever, there were no major conlicts with the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
Croatia. he “loyalty” and “patriotism” of the Orthodox clergy, as opposed to 
the “impropriety” of Catholic dignitaries, was stressed by Tito himself in an 
interview for the bulletin of the French communist party, L’Humanite, pub-
lished in early November 1945. It may be assumed that there were no greater 
conlicts with the Serbian Orthodox Church because in its attitude toward the 
NDH and the restoration of Yugoslavia it supported the new authorities. he 
reuniication of Serbs in a single state, which was the prime motivation of that 
Church’s political activities, took away any further need for its political en-
gagement. hus, the difering stance of the KPJ on the Catholic Church and 
the Serbian Orthodox Church was actually a result of the diferent attitudes 
of these two churches toward the communist authorities and Yugoslavia. Ad-
ditionally, the Croatian Serbs had joined the Partisans in mass numbers and 
joined the KPJ in a much higher percentage than their share in the population. 
his also weakened the inluence of the Serbian Orthodox Church.68
65 Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. do 1966. 
godine, p. 73.
66 Radić, Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970., 1., 195; Miroslav Akmadža, Katolička crkva u 
Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945. – 1966. (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 2004), p. 38.
67 Marko Jerković, “Školski vjeronauk u Hrvatskoj nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata (1945-1952)”, 
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he Crusaders – anti-communist guerrillas
Immediately ater the war, approximately 120,000 Chetniks, members 
of the Serbian Volunteer Corps (called ljotićevci ater their leader Dimitrije 
Ljotić), loyalists of the Serbian collaborationist Milan Nedić (nedićevci) and 
Ustasha were arrested, interned or executed.69 Many surviving members of the 
defeated armed forces went into hiding, and some continued to engaged in 
armed operations. A major role here was played by the Crusaders (križari), 
members of the former NDH armed forces. heir primary motivations for 
continuing the struggle were anti-communism, anti-Yugoslavism and an in-
dependent Croatian state, but also belief in a pending war between the West-
ern powers and the USSR. Many Crusaders hoped that Ante Pavelić would 
return, and not a few of them wanted Vladko Maček to stand at the head of the 
Croatian people. he émigré leadership of the NDH and many Crusaders were 
counting on an alliance with the United States and Great Britain, maintaining 
contacts with their intelligence agencies and stressing that the fundamental 
objective of their struggle was and remained a Croatian state. hey wanted to 
forget their former wartime hostility toward the Allies as well as their alliance 
with the hird Reich and Fascist Kingdom of Italy.
he Crusaders operated in a little over 200 unconnected groups, mainly 
without commanders and without political guidance. Crusader cells most of-
ten had up to 10 members. hey did not undertake any major military actions, 
nor did they form zones under their control; their most intense activity was 
recorded immediately ater the military defeat in 1945. From the end of the 
war until the end of 1945, their numbers continually and rapidly declined, 
and there were about 2,500 of them. he Crusaders wanted to maintain a state 
of emergency. hey halted traic, ambushed individuals, usually communist 
activists, and less oten police patrols, and they also attacked collective farms 
as well as the main supply sources, because these were perceived as symbols 
of communism. hey operated exclusively in rural areas and the villages from 
which their members came and where they could be obtain provisions and 
ind shelter. here were no armed activities in towns and cities, but illegal or-
ganizations of secondary school and university students were active, mainly 
writing slogans on walls (graiti) and tearing down posters and other propa-
ganda materials.
As opposed to the Crusaders, who operated in the territory of Croatia (ex-
cept for Istria), the Chetniks operated in areas in which there was a higher 
Serbian population, mostly in the hinterland of northern and central Dalmatia 
and in Lika. hey were less present in central and northern Croatia, mainly in 
rad popova. Rad vjerskih organizacija u 1947 godini.); Radmila Radić, “Politička ideologija kao 
sekularna religija i njena integrativna funkcija”, in: Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac, ed., Dijalog 
povjesničara-istoričara, 4, Pečuj, 20. – 22. oktobra 2000., (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 466-483, 475.
69 Yugoslavia, East-Central Europe Under the Communists, p. 163.
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Kordun, Banovina, Posavina (the lower Sava River Valley) and Slavonia. Im-
mediately ater the war, there were several hundred Chetniks in Croatia, but 
already by the autumn of 1945 their numbers declined to less than 70.
he Yugoslav authorities feared the anti-communist mobilization of Croa-
tian émigré communities, but also of other emigrants from the territory of 
Yugoslavia. Ater a dramatic showdown with the Crusaders and those who 
supported them, as well as the amnesty declared on 5 August 1945, guerrilla 
activity largely dissipated, although it did persist in subsequent years.70
Borders of the People’s Republic of Croatia
Given the question of internal borders, in comparison to the NDH the new 
Yugoslavia and Croatia were in a subordinate position in terms of competing 
propaganda. While questions concerning the belonging of Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na and Vojvodina were at the forefront of plans by both the HSS and the Usta-
sha organization, the KPJ advocated a much narrower Croatia. However, the 
KPJ could boast of a considerable extension of external borders. he taking 
of Istria, Rijeka, Zadar, the Croatian Littoral, Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia was 
crucial.
An arrangement was concluded between the United States, Great Britain 
and Yugoslavia in Belgrade on 9 June 1945 concerning the temporary division 
of the border area between Yugoslavia and Italy into two occupation zones. 
Zone A with the cities of Trieste and Pula was under Allied administration, 
while zone B was under Yugoslav administration. he demarcation was estab-
lished along the so-called Morgan Line, named ater British General William 
Morgan.71 he only Croatian interstate border that remained the same as in the 
pre-war period was the border with Hungary.72
he borders between the Yugoslav republics were established on the basis 
of two principles: historical and ethnic. All republics were founded on the ba-
sis of ethnicity, except for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was primarily rooted in 
the historical principle. he basis for the determination of the borders between 
the six federal units came from deliberations held by the Presidency of AVNOJ 
on 24 February 1945. Croatia was deined “within the borders of the former 
70 O križarima See:  Zdenko Radelić, Križari – gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1950.(Zdenko Radelić, 
Križari – gerila u Hrvatskoj: 1945.-1950., drugo izmijenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje).
71 Zgodovina Slovencev (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1979), pp. 925-933; Dukovski, Rat i mir 
istarski, p. 171; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992, p. 176; Međunarodni politički leksikon, “STT”, ed. 
Marijan Hubeny, Branko Kojić i Bogdan Krizman, 1960, p. 489-490.
72 Mladen Klemenčić, “Novija historijsko-geografska osnovica jugoslavenskih izvanjskih i un-
utarnjih granica s posebnim osvrtom na hrvatske granice”, in: Političko-geografska i demografska 
pitanja Hrvatske (Zagreb: Savez geografskih društava Hrvatske, Posebna izdanja, 8., 1991), pp. 
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Sava Banovina together with 13 districts of the former Littoral Banovina and 
the Dubrovnik District from the former Zeta Banovina”.73
he Croatian-Slovenian border in Istria was not entirely deined. Problems 
around the border were made more complex when applying the principles of 
demarcation according to ethnic, ecclesiastical and cadastral boundaries as 
well as economic logic. he borders between Croatia and Slovenia were irst 
determined by representatives of the Croatian and Slovenian Partisan move-
ment in February 1944, when they assigned jurisdictions.74
he Croatian-Slovenian border in Međimurje largely corresponded to pre-
vious boundaries of this Croatian region and Slovenia’s Prlekija, and where 
individual villages belonged was determined over the course of 1945 and 
1946. Not a single solution satisied all of the local residents whose nation-
al consciousness had not been entirely formed. hey considered themselves 
Međimurje people (Međimurci) irst, and they were more economically in-
clined toward Slovenia and learned to speak Slovenian in school, but listened 
to the Croatian language in church.75
he most problematic demarcation between Croatia and Serbia was in Sri-
jem, where the border was largely of more recent origin. In the summer of 
1945, the AVNOJ Presidium’s commission charged with establishing the de-
marcation between Croatia and Vojvodina delineated the border based on the 
ethnic principle, taking into account geographic and economic considerations, 
while the historical principle was neglected, as the objective was to have as 
little of the other unit’s population remain on the opposite side of the border.76
Demarcation of the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in-
volved an inconsistent combination of the historical and ethnic principle. he 
borders of the Banovina of Croatia were not acknowledged, while the former 
Ottoman access to the sea at Klek and Neum was, although a similar outlet to 
the sea between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro near Sutorina was not. 
73 Zakonodavni rad Pretsedništva Antifašističkog veća narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije i 
Pretsedništva Privremene narodne skupštine DFJ, 19 novembra 1944 godine – 27 oktobra 1945 
godine, 58; Stjepan Sršan, Sjeveroistočne granice Hrvatske(Osijek, Državni arhiv u Osijeku - 
Državna geodetska uprava u Zagrebu, 2003), pp. 51, 52.
74 Dukovski, Rat i mir istarski, p. 153; Zdenko Čepić, “Oris nastajanja slovensko-hrvaške meje 
po Drugi svetovni vojni”, in: Zdenko Čepič, Dušan Nećak, Miroslav Stiplovšek, ed., Mikužev 
zbornik(Ljubljana, Oddelek za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete, 1999): pp. 201-215, 204.
75 Klemenčić, “Novija historijsko-geografska osnovica jugoslavenskih izvanjskih i unutarn-
jih granica s posebnim osvrtom na hrvatske granice”: 326; Čepić, “Oris nastajanja slovensko-
hrvaške meje po Drugi svetovni vojni”, p. 206-209.
76 Zapisnici NKOJ-a i Privremene vlade DFJ 1943-1945., prir. Branko Petranović i Ljiljana 
Marković (Belgrade: Memorijalni centar Josip Broz Tito – Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, 1991), p. 
589; Klemenčić, “Novija historijsko-geografska osnovica jugoslavenskih izvanjskih i unutarnjih 
granica s posebnim osvrtom na hrvatske granice”, 328; Ivo Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita: In-
formbirovski rascjepi u jugoslavenskom komunističkom pokretu (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), p. 111.
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hus, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s access to the Adriatic Sea in the east between two 
republics was not established, while the one that geographically partitioned 
Croatia was.77 In the inland section, an exception to older borders was the 
demarcation at Plješivica, when certain Croatian settlements were attached to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1945.78
If one accepts the stance that those areas which had a Croatian name, a 
majority Croatian ethnic composition in the local population, a Croatian his-
torical tradition or a seat of administration in its current territory should be 
considered a part of Croatia, then the borders in 1945, compared to 1918, were 
generally altered to its detriment. hus, in comparison to the situation in the 
Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, divided between the two 
sections of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1918, the Banovina of Croatia 
in 1939, and the NDH in 1945, Croatia lost Bosnia-Herzegovina and most of 
Srijem, and the coastal belt from Boka Kotorska through Budva to Spič, while 
it obtained Baranja, which became a part of Yugoslavia in 1918, Dvor na Uni, 
and – at Italy’s expense – Cres, Lastovo, Lošinj, Rijeka, Zadar and Istria.79 Ex-
pansion into former Italian territories would also be formally ratiied by inter-
national treaties in subsequent years.
he courts and repression
On 3 February 1945, the AVNOJ Presidium voided all legal regulations 
enacted during the occupation, and also all those regulations in efect prior to 
6 April 1941, if they contradicted the values of the People’s Liberation Struggle, 
the decisions made by AVNOJ, the NKOJ and the antifascist councils of the 
federal units and their governments. No indications was given as to what these 
values were.80
Despite the extrajudicial sanctions meted out against enemies, the legal 
system was gradually developed. Courts martial functioned until 24 August 
1945, and the Decree establishing courts martial contained a rather ambiguous 
deinition of who was considered a people’s enemy.81 In the irst months follow-
77 Franjo Tuđman, Povijesna sudba naroda (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1996), p. 437.
78 Mladen Klemenčić, “Granica između Hrvatske i BiH u području Ličke Plješivice”, in: 
Spomenica Ljube Bobana (Zagreb: Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu, 1996), pp. 397–405, 399, 400, 403, 404; Klemenčić, “Novija historijsko-geografska os-
novica jugoslavenskih izvanjskih i unutarnjih granica s posebnim osvrtom na hrvatske granice”, 
p. 327; Husnija Kamberović, Prema modernom društvin: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1945. do 1950.
(Tešanj: Centar za kulturu i obrazovanje, 2000), pp. 26, 28.
79 Klemenčić, “Novija historijsko-geografska osnovica jugoslavenskih izvanjskih i unutarnjih 
granica s posebnim osvrtom na hrvatske granice”, p. 330.
80 Službeni list DFJ, 1945./4; Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, p. 190.
81 Slobodan Nešović, Stvaranje nove Jugoslavije 1941-1945 (Belgrade: Partizanska knjiga – Lju-
bljana, OOUR Izdavačko-publicistička delatnost – Belgrade, Mladost – Belgrade, 1981), p. 415.
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ing the war, the Decree was the sole penal law foundation for trials, and courts 
martial had jurisdiction over all major criminal acts, regardless of whether 
or not the perpetrator was in the military. It was amended in April 1945 by 
a decree governing prison sentences and conidential instructions from the 
defence ministry. he Crimes Against the People and State Act of 25 August 
1945 was supposed to supplant the criminal code of Democratic Federal Yu-
goslavia. It instituted the transition from courts martial to civilian courts. Also 
important was the decision on the transfer of enemy assets to state ownership, 
released in November 1944, which was amended in 1945 and later by the con-
iscation law and decrees regulating the protection of public assets and their 
management, as well as various instructions governing seizures. Procedures 
were also conducted on the basis of a law regulating the treatment of aban-
doned assets formerly seized by the occupying powers, a law on the seizure of 
wartime proits and the law banning the incitement of ethnic, sectarian and 
religious hatred.82
he manner in which the courts functioned can be illustrated by the situ-
ation in Zagreb ater 8 May 1945. he Zagreb Court Martial handed out many 
death sentences without even recording or writing out the verdicts. Since the 
Coniscation Act speciied that coniscations could only be conducted on the 
basis of a court ruling, and not on the basis of a memorandum from the court 
that issued the ruling, the People’s Circuit Court in Zagreb requested tran-
scripts of rulings from the Court Martial in Zagreb. But such rulings did not 
exist. his is why the president of the Court Martial, Vlado Ranogajec, asked 
Justice Minister Dušan Brkić to issue an order to courts to accept a memo-
randum from the Court Martial while specifying that an actual ruling would 
not be necessary. Minister Brkić did indeed issue an order to that efect to the 
People’s Circuit Court in Zagreb.83
he tribunals of national honour in Croatia operated from 24 April to 8 
September 1945, when their jurisdiction was assumed by the people’s circuit 
courts. Courts martial tried cases involving the grave crimes of “traitors and 
enemies”, such as war crimes and treason, while the tribunals of national hon-
our dealt with cultural, economic, legal or similar cooperation with the “occu-
piers and domestic traitors”. Activities subject to such punishment were very 
broadly deined. For example, there was mention of friendly relations with the 
enemy army and “any activity” which “was intended to serve the occupier and 
82 Konstantin Bastaić, “Razvitak organa pravosuđa u novoj Jugoslaviji”, in: Ferdo Čulinović, ed., 
Nova Jugoslavija. Pregled državnopravnog razvitka povodom desetgodišnjice Drugog zasjedanja 
AVNOJ-a (Zagreb, Institut za historiju države i prava Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 1954), pp. 
67-116, 109; Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, pp. 229, 262, 279-282; Michael Port-
mann, “Communist Retaliation and Persecution on Yugoslav Territory During and Ater WWII 
(1943-1950)”, Tokovi istorije, (2004), no. 1-2: 45-74, 54.
83 Frano Glavina, “Tamne strane hrvatskog nogometa: Vlado Ranogajec zaslužan za Dinamo, 
poguban za pravedno sudstvo”, Hrvatsko slovo, 7 March 2003.
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his collaborators”. Since at the time when such acts were committed there were 
no laws that sanctioned violations of “national honour”, this entailed a viola-
tion of the legal principle that there is no culpability if an act is not speciied as 
punishable by an efective law. he punishments included loss of national hon-
our, compulsory labour, partial or complete coniscation of assets or monetary 
ines and exile. he tribunals for the protection of national honour were actu-
ally revolutionary courts against respected and wealthier citizens and private 
property, and their aim was to create state-owned assets. Besides losing their 
property in whole or in part, the convicted were also stripped of their civil 
rights, including the right to vote. In this fashion, the communists excluded 
the wealthier and more enterprising class from the economy and politics, as its 
members were banned from working in the civil service or engaging in public 
activities.84
It has been noted that the criminal code abolished the classical principle 
whereby culpability does not exist if an act is not speciied as punishable by 
law, because the possibility of pronouncing sentences for any manner of crimi-
nal act was foreseen. he public prosecutor of the People’s Republic of Croa-
tia, Jakov Blažević, announced that the courts were fortresses from which the 
people would settle scores with the enemy, while in 1945 the chief public pros-
ecutor of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Jože Vilfan, explained 
this revolutionary principle with the assertion that a criminal act may be less 
important one day, but then acquire irst-class importance at some point in 
the future. he state became the fundamental object of legal protection, rather 
than property and the rights of human beings and citizens. he most impor-
tant laws were the Impermissible Speculation and Economic Sabotage Preven-
tion Act of 23 April 1945, the National, Racial and Religious Hatred Incitement 
Prohibition Act of 24 may 1945 and the Crimes Against the People and State 
Act of 25 August 1945.85 A civilian judiciary was established on the basis of a 
decision made by the Interim National Assembly on 26 August 1945 passed 
the People’s Court Organization Act.86
84 Ivo Perić, Hrvatski državni sabor 1848. – 2000. Treći svezak: 1918. – 2000. (Zagreb, Hrvatski 
institut za povijest – Dom i svijet, 2000), p. 175; Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, 
pp. 188, 190, 273, 279; Bogdan Zlatarić, “Razvitak novog jugoslavenskog krivičnog prava”, in: 
Ferdo Čulinović, ed., Nova Jugoslavija. Pregled državnopravnog razvitka povodom desetgodišnjice 
Drugog zasjedanja AVNOJ-a, (Zagreb: Institut za historiju države i prava Pravnog fakulteta u 
Zagrebu, 1954), 306-335, p. 322; Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-
1946., p. 263.
85 Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1988. godine, pp. 384, 445; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-
1992 – Nastanek, razvoj ter raspad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije, pp. 165, 209; Marija 
Obradović, “‘Partijska država’ kao element političkog sistema ‘narodne demokratije’ u Jugoslav-
iji (1945-1952)”, in: Razvoj, dileme i perspektive jugoslavenskog socijalizma, (Zagreb, 1988), pp. 
173-184, 177, 178; Zlatarić, “Razvitak novog jugoslavenskog krivičnog prava”, pp. 306-335, 324.
86 Mikola, Sodni procesi na Celjskem 1944-1951, p. 100; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992, p. 164.
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Numerous laws and decrees which encroached upon private ownership 
and which penalized a neutral stance during the war created an atmosphere 
of retaliation and expropriation, in which the boundary between punishing 
actual criminal and the revolutionary seizure of authority and property was 
blurred.
he Penalty Classiication Act of 10 July 1945 ranked punishments from 
the least severe to the death penalty: compulsory labour without loss of per-
sonal liberty, expulsion from one’s place of residence, loss of political and indi-
vidual civil rights, loss of the right to engage in civil service, prohibition from 
engaging in certain types of work or trades, loss or elimination of rank or pro-
fession, loss of personal liberty from 6 months to 20 years, loss of citizenship 
and the death penalty.87
he irst Press Act was promulgated on 24 August 1945. Publications 
which incited national, racial or religious hatred, called for revolt, insulted al-
lied countries, gave succour to external enemies, called for refusal to serve in 
the military, threatened state interests and contained slander against the state’s 
representative bodies were banned. Printers had to deliver publications to the 
municipal public prosecutor prior to distribution. he public prosecutor could 
order a temporary ban.88
According to incomplete data, the Partisans shot 38 journalists, while out 
of the 332 journalists accredited by the NDH government, 129 led abroad. 
Roughly one hundred journalists were banned from writing, while twenty-
seven were allowed to do so. he reason was not only their stance during the 
war, but also the aspiration of the KPJ to take all of the press and radio into its 
hands.89 Of the religious bulletins, only those with a local character, such as, for 
example, Glasnik biskupije đakovačke i srijemske (Bulletin of the Đakovo and 
Srijem Diocese), which was published in a shorter form, and Gore srca (Hearts 
Aire) in Pazin.90 he Order on the Prohibition of Ustasha and Fascist Publica-
tions was released on 10 August 1945. A special commission was established 
to inspect such materials.91 Books were publicly burned, although there are 
87 Zakon o vrstama kazni, Službeni list FNRJ, 48., 10. 7. 1945.
88 Ivana Hebrang Grgić, “Zakoni o tisku u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do danas”, Vjesnik bibliotekara 
Hrvatske, (2000), no. 3: 117-134, 119, 120.
89 Josip Grbelja, Cenzura u hrvatskom novinstvin: 1945. – 1990. (Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 1998), 
pp. 64, 71, 81; Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska povijest (Zagreb: Novi liber, 2003), p. 306.
90 Jerković, “Školski vjeronauk u Hrvatskoj nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata (1945-1952)”, p. 
101; Božo Milanović, Moje uspomene (1900-1976) (Pazin: IKD sv. Ćirila i Metoda - Kršćanska 
sadašnjost, 1976), p. 160.
91 I. Hebrang Grgić, “Zakoni o tisku u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do danas”, p. 119; Čedomir Višnjić, 
Partizansko ljetovanje: Hrvatska i Srbi 1945-1950. (Zagreb: Srpsko kulturno društvo Prosvjeta, 
2003), p. 405.
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no written sources testifying to this.92 In addition to direct bans, the KPJ also 
made use of bans on private publishing activity and nationalization of private 
presses, bookstores and reading rooms and deprived publishers of paper.93
he most important role in disseminating communist ideas was played by 
propaganda, which was put forth by the leadership of the party’s agitation and 
propaganda departments. Over 100 people, generally professionals, worked in 
the “agitprop system” in Croatia.94
A simplistic (black-and-white) reporting style predominated in newspa-
pers. For example, news from Eastern Europe and the “great” USSR exclusively 
recounted successes and the more pleasant side of life, while news from the 
West, particularly from the United States and Great Britain, spoke of imperial-
ism, racism, strikes, unemployment, small salaries and high prices.95
One of the major tasks was education and raising the population’s literacy 
levels. A vital role – due to widespread illiteracy – was played by ilm. Soviet 
ilms which, like domestic productions, were still in their nascent stages and 
under strict party control, exerted an immense propagandistic inluence.96 Out 
of the total 217 imported feature-length ilms in 1945, 93 were from the USSR, 
while 70 came from the US, the country with the world’s strongest motion 
picture industry.97
Besides suppressing non-communist inluences in the press and literature, 
in 1945 the authorities, with the help of SKOJ members, organized youth bri-
gades charged with removing signs from squares and tradesmen’s shops written 
in the so-called archaic orthography. In Zagreb, for example, those who ignored 
or were not aware of the decision had their storefronts wrecked by youth activ-
ists led by members of the SKOJ’s City Committee. Notable among the initia-
tors of this street violence by young communists was Marko Belinić, a member 
of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of 
Croatia. At youth gatherings, SKOJ activists beat those who they designated 
as pro-Ustasha or clericalists. hey made use of public denunciation, beatings 
and expulsion from school, not only against those who had resorted to violence 
themselves during the time of the NDH, but also against the children of the 
92 Hebrang Grgić, “Zakoni o tisku u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do danas”, p. 130.
93 Grbelja, Cenzura u hrvatskom novinstvin: 1945. – 1990., p. 67; Spehnjak, Javnost i propa-
ganda. Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945. – 1952., p. 98.
94 Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda: Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945. – 1952., p. 
95; Spehnjak, Vlast i javnost u Hrvatskoj 1945. – 1952., pp. 508, 509.
95 Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik, p. 181.
96 Zlata Knezović, “Idejnopolitička uloga sovjetskih ilmova u ilmskom repertoaru u Hrvat-
skoj 1945-1952.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, (1988), no. 1–2: 137-171.
97 Knezović, “Idejnopolitička uloga sovjetskih ilmova u ilmskom repertoaru u Hrvatskoj 
1945-1952.”, pp. 141, 144.
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wealthy, those who did not like the regime and devotees of Western  culture.98 
he authorities even transferred suspect teachers.99
he new authorities stamped out traditions. Initially a new interpretation 
was given to certain traditions. On 6 December 1945, the newspaper Vjesnik 
mentioned St. Nicholas, but emphasis was placed on the fact children were not 
given gits from “some imaginary basket” but rather from the people’s organi-
zations and Tito.
he Ustasha authorities set national criteria as the measure of any public 
event, which in relation to the Roma, Serbs and Jews went to the point of the 
complete exclusion and destruction of their communities. At the same time, 
dedication to the national ofered limitless possibilities for expressing Croa-
tian pride, from the names of institutions to the extolling of historical events, 
except, to be sure, in areas which were under the control of the Kingdom of 
Italy. With the fall of the NDH, despite the federal structure and the emphasis 
placed on national equality, the national approach in everyday life was gradu-
ally suppressed. For example, in 1945, it is likely that many experienced the 
change in the name of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science, restoring its 
previous name, the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Science, as an anti-Croatian 
move.
Social revolution
he drastic treatment of occupation collaborators was customary through-
out Europe, but in Yugoslavia the accusation that anyone had collaborated with 
the occupying powers was oten simply a pretence for revolutionary measures 
and seizure of property. hus, private property, most oten in agriculture, in-
dustry, inance, commerce and transportation, was expropriated. Actual guilt 
was unimportant; all that mattered was the political and economic aims of the 
KPJ. his is supported by the fact that in the later period many had groundless 
court rulings against them rescinded or their prison sentences commuted, but 
their property was almost never returned to them. Many convictions for trea-
son actually concealed revolutionary procedures which the KPJ initially, due 
to international considerations and the need to reinforce its authority, avoided 
openly implementing.100
98 Jure Bilić, 71’ koja je to godina (Zagreb: CIP, 1990), p. 102; Radovan Stipetić, “Kako sam 
spasio Pavletića od skojevskih batina”, Jutarnji list. Magazin, 30. 10. 2004., p. 33; Stanko Lasić, 
Autobiografski zapisi (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000), p. 503.
99 Perić, Hrvatski državni sabor 1848. – 2000. Treći svezak: 1918. – 2000., p. 176; Spehnjak, 
Javnost i propaganda: Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945. – 1952., p. 198.
100 Marijan Maticka, “Zakonski propisi o vlasničkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji (1944-1948)”, Ra-
dovi, (1992): 123-148, 129; Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, p. 415; Nebojša Popov, 
“Traumatologija partijske države”, Nebojša Popov, ed., Srpska strana rata: Trauma i katarza u 
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Property was seized pursuant to law, but many laws were not aligned 
with international legal principles, particularly those which speciied what 
constituted collaboration with the occupying powers. Later the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip 
Hrnčević, spoke about the coniscation of assets as outcomes “generated by 
our revolution”.101 According to a statement by Boris Kidrič made in October 
1946, seizure of property based on convictions for alleged treason was “a spe-
ciic form of expropriation of the expropriators”, actually “expropriation on the 
broadest patriotic foundation” because “the former expropriators had collabo-
rated with the occupiers due to class reasons”.
In Yugoslavia, foreign capital had a 49.5% share in industry, for example. 
Given this fact, nationalization would have exacerbated relations with allies, 
particularly since the Declaration of the Interim Government of the Demo-
cratic Federal Yugoslavia of 7 March 1945 stressed no encroachments would 
be made on private property. However, coniscations of assets were quite fre-
quent. he authorities did not pay any compensation for what was taken, as 
was the case in later nationalization procedures, while at the same time owners 
were discredited and prevented from engaging in political activity.102
In the series of legislative solutions which encroached upon ownership 
issues, the most important were these decrees and laws: the Decree on Courts 
Martial of 24 May 1944, the Decision on the Transfer of Enemy Assets to 
State Ownership, State Management of Assets of Absent Individuals and the 
Sequester of Assets Forcefully Expropriated by the Occupying Authorities of 
21 November 1944, the Impermissible Speculation and Economic Sabotage 
Prevention Act of 23 April 1945, the Decision on the Protection of the National 
Honour of the Croats and Serbs in Croatia of 24 April 1945, the National, 
Racial and Religious Hatred Incitement Prohibition Act of 24 may 1945, the 
Wartime Occupation Proit Seizure Act of 24 May 1945, the Asset Coniscation 
and Execution of Coniscation Act of 9 June 1945, the Occupation Currency 
Withdrawal Exchange Rate and Liability in Croatia Act of 21 June 1945, the 
Crimes Against the People and State Act of 25 August 1945, the Act Depriving 
Citizenship to Former Oicers and Non-commissioned Oicers of the 
Former Yugoslav Army who Refuse to Return to heir Homeland, Members 
of Collaborationist Military Formations who Fled Abroad and Persons who 
Fled Abroad Ater Liberation of 23 August 1945 (entered into force upon 
istorijskom pamćenju (Belgrade: 2001), pp. 117-148, 92; Milko Mikola, Zaplembe premoženja 
v Sloveniji 1943 – 1952 (Celje: Zgodovinski arhiv Celje, 1999), p. 154, 186; Momčilo Mitrović, 
“Narodni i državni neprijatelji u Srbiji posle Drugoga svetskog rata”, Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor 
Graovac, ed., Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, 6, Zagreb, 5. – 7. listopada 2001. (Zagreb, 2002): 
249-265, 251.
101 Ibid., 25.
102 Mikola, Zaplembe premoženja v Sloveniji 1943 – 1952, p. 293; Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 
1918 – 1988.godine, p. 381.
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its publication on 28 August 1945), the Agrarian Reform and Colonization 
Act of 23 August and the Federal Croatia Agrarian Reform and Colonization 
Implementation Act of 24 November 1945.103
he Decision on the Transfer of Enemy Assets to State Ownership, State 
Management of Assets of Absent Individuals and the Sequester of Assets 
Forcefully Expropriated by the Occupying Authorities of 21 November 1944 
was further interpreted in Croatia by the Instructions for work pertaining to 
implementation of the proposal for the temporary transfer of enemy assets to 
the management and supervision of the State People’s Goods Administration 
of the Territorial Commission that was charged with investigating the crimes 
of the occupiers and their domestic collaborators. According the instructions 
issued by the Internal Afairs Commission of ZAVNOH on 19 March 1945, a 
written decision from the administrative section of a municipal People’s Lib-
eration Committee was suicient to consider certain property state-owned, 
without the need for a court ruling.104
Pursuant to judgements issued by the courts for the protection of national 
honour, 117 industrial enterprises and 189 landed estates and other real estate 
were coniscated.105
Pursuant to the Asset Coniscation and Execution of Coniscation Act of 
9 June 1945, the assets of persons that the People’s Liberation Movement had 
sentenced to death either by court decision or in extrajudiciary proceedings or 
had led abroad at the end of the war were appropriated. By 31 December 1945, 
according to data from the State People’s Goods Administration (DUND) and 
the territorial people’s goods administrations (ZUND), in Croatia 8,025 appli-
cations for appropriation were iled.106
he Impermissible Speculation and Economic Sabotage Prevention Act 
was adopted on 23 April 1945. Sabotage was, among other things, deined as 
the irrational stockpiling of raw materials.
Under the Wartime Occupation Proit Seizure Act of 24 May 1945, proit 
was ascertained as any surplus value in comparison to the balance as at 6 April 
1941 resulting from economic activities related to exploitation of wartime cir-
cumstances. Estimates were made of what would have been earned under nor-
mal conditions, so all proits over 250,000 dinars were seized. Cases of persons 
103 Mikola, Zaplembe premoženja v Sloveniji 1943 – 1952, pp. 17, 185; Akmadža, Oduzimanje 
imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. do 1966. godine, p. 127; Michael Port-
mann, “Nasilje tijekom izgradnje države i društva komunističke Jugoslavije (1944-1946)”, in: 
Zorislav Lukić, ed., Represija i zločini komunističkog režima u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Matica hrvat-
ska, 2012): 149-158, 152.
104 Maticka, Zakonski propisi o vlasničkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji (1944-1948), p. 135.
105 Perić, Hrvatski državni sabor 1848. – 2000. Treći svezak: 1918. – 2000., p. 175; Partizanska i 
komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946., p. 263.
106 Mikola, Zaplembe premoženja v Sloveniji 1943 – 1952, p. 178.
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being tried for wartime proits of 4,500 dinars have been recorded. For the sake 
of comparison, in July 1945 salaries ranged from 1,500 dinars to the highest 
pay grade with salaries over 6,000 dinars.107
he Act on Treatment of Assets which Owners had to Abandon during the 
Occupation and Assets Seized from hem by the Occupiers and heir Col-
laborators of 24 May 1945 did not stipulate the restitution of all property, such 
as mines for example. In “the interests of the people’s economy”, the authorities 
opposed the accumulation of wealth “in the hands of individuals”.108
In the restriction of private property, an important role was played by the 
Occupation Currency Withdrawal Exchange Rate and Liability in Bosnia-
Herzegovina Act of 7 June 1945 and the Occupation Currency Withdrawal 
Exchange Rate and Liability in Croatia Act of 21 June 1945, creating a con-
solidated inancial territory. From 30 June to 9 July 1945, three currency ter-
ritories in Croatia were abolished: the Croatian kuna, the Italian lire and the 
Hungarian pengo. Besides determining the exchange rate, also important was 
the provision whereby cash up to a value of 5,000 dinars of Democratic Federal 
Yugoslavia could be exchanged. For sums above this value, certiicates were 
issued that were payable within a period of three months. However, they were 
not disbursed in their full value, rather a progressive percentage was exempted 
for the Fund for the Renewal of the Country and Aid to Stricken Areas. he 
upper limit for the expropriation of savings was 70% of its value.109 However, 
Reichmarks could not be exchanged for dinars, rather their possession was 
deemed evidence of collaboration with the occupier.110
State-owned assets were managed by the State People’s Goods Administra-
tion (DUND), and by the territorial people’s goods administrations (ZUND) 
in the federal units, with branch sections in districts, municipalities and towns. 
Factories were generally managed by an expert director, but the deputy direc-
tor, with virtually the same authority, was usually a member of the Communist 
Party.
Social revolutionary measures achieved several aims: strengthening the 
state, weakening the private sector, eliminating dependence on foreign capital, 
partially collecting reparations for wartime destruction and gradually central-
izing the economy.111
107 Maticka, Zakonski propisi o vlasničkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji (1944-1948), p. 131; HDA, 
CK SKH, i. b. 307, Izvještaj CK KPH, 17. 3. 1946; HDA, SSJ-ZSD, 22. 7. 1945.
108 Maticka, Zakonski propisi o vlasničkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji (1944-1948), p. 132; 
Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. do 1966. go-
dine, p. 139.
109 Maticka, Zakonski propisi o vlasničkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji (1944-1948), p. 129.
110 Yugoslavia, East-Central Europe Under the Communists, p. 333.
111 Branko Horvat, ABC jugoslavenskog socijalizma (Zagreb: Globus, 1984), p. 32.
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Agrarian policy
Already in the irst year, the authorities implemented agrarian reform, 
and privately-owned land was allocated to peasants. his did not comply with 
Marxist doctrine on the abolishment of individual peasant farms. he reforms 
were based on the principle that the land belonged to the one cultivating it, 
for initially the KPJ needed the support of the peasants. he laws that facili-
tated the implementation of agrarian reform were the Agrarian Reform and 
Colonization Act of 23 August and the Federal Croatia Agrarian Reform and 
Colonization Implementation Act of 24 November 1945.112
he permitted maximum for privately-owned land was set according to 
the following categories: 45 ha, or 25 ha of cultivable surfaces for large estates, 
3 ha for non-peasant holdings, 20 to 25 ha for peasant holdings, and 30 ha in 
mountain regions. he maximum depended on the size of a family, the qual-
ity of the land and the types of agricultural surfaces. he church could have a 
maximum of 10 ha of cultivable land, and 30 ha of cultivable land and 30 ha 
of forests surrounding religious structures of particular historical value. Forest 
holdings were limited from 8 to a maximum of 15 ha, and in mountain areas 
they could be up to 15 ha.113
he Farm Labourer Debt Final Liquidation Act of 26 August 1945 wrote 
of peasant debts up to 5,000 dinars, while regardless of the amount debts were 
abolished for all deceased, Partisan ighters and their family members and all 
members of the Yugoslav royal army who were slain in 1941, and for all victims 
of terror and prisoners of war. A part of the debts of those who sufered in the 
war and who aided the Partisans was also written of.114
Pursuant to the decisions of the AVNOJ Presidium of 21 November 1944, 
the internal afairs departments of the people’s committees issued decisions 
on the nationalization of the assets of the Volksdeutsche and the expulsion of 
the latter to Germany or their assignment to forced labour in camps. he mass 
expulsion of Germans created the conditions for colonization, i.e., the move-
ment of impoverished peasants into areas with more abundant farmland.115 
However, prior to this, another problem that need to be solved involved the 
peasants in Dalmatia, Hrvatsko Zagorje, Lika and Bosnia-Herzegovina, who 
during the NDH had been moved to eastern Slavonia, whence the Serbian 
“Salonika” veterans had been expelled. In Slavonia there were 7,000 such colo-
nists from Hrvatsko Zagorje. Ater the war, the organized return of many to 
112 Maticka, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1948., p. 47, 53.
113 Maticka, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1948., p. 47, 53; Akmadža, 
Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945. – 1966., p. 33.
114 Maticka, Zakonski propisi o vlasničkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji (1944-1948), p. 141.
115 Vladimir Geiger, Folksdojčeri pod teretom kolektivne krivnje (Osijek: Njemačka narodnosna 
zajednica, 2002), p. 33.
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the districts from which they had come was carried out. About 1,000 colonists 
from Hrvatsko Zagorje from the time of the NDH remained, because their 
expulsion had been halted and they were accommodated on formerly German 
farms. hose who had cooperated with the “enemy” had to leave their farms 
and take care of themselves.116
Most land was taken from Germans, corporations, large estates, church-
es, owners of coniscated estates, those who backed down from colonization 
and, ultimately, the owners of non-peasant holdings over 3 ha.117 Among the 
larger expropriated landowners were the churches, most notably the Catholic 
Church.118
he criteria for including persons in colonization were: participation in the 
Partisans, residence in overpopulated areas and poverty. Families from Croa-
tia were resettled outside Croatia mostly in Bačka, in Vojvodina, and inside 
Croatia in Baranja, Slavonia and Srijem. Most of the colonists were from the 
districts of Donji Lapac, Gospić, Gračac, Korenica, Otočac and Udbina in Lika, 
from the districts of Benkovac, Knin, Sinj, Split, Šibenik and Zadar in Dalma-
tia and from the districts of Dvor na Uni, Glina, Ogulin, Plaški, Slunj, Vojnić 
and Vrginmost in Banovina, Gorskom kotar and Kordun.119 In 1945 alone, 
3,898 families consisting of 19,364 persons were resettled from their original 
homes.120 Colonization continued with greater intensity in the later period. 
Many more of the colonists were so-called local agrarian beneiciaries. As op-
posed to colonists, agrarian beneiciaries received land in their home area, so 
they did not participate in a move to another part of Croatia. he number of 
local agrarian beneiciaries for 1945 speciically is not known.
Land was also allocated to peasant labour collectives, federal republic agri-
cultural farms, district and municipal and local people’s goods reserves.121 he 
irst four peasant labour collectives in Croatia were formed in 1945, encom-
passing 72 households.122
he primary objective of communist agrarian measures, besides redistri-
bution of land and colonization, was the system of mandatory purchase prices. 
It was based on coercion, and peasants could not inluence either the price 
or the quantity of products which they had to sell. At the same time, peas-
116 Maticka, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1948., pp. 36, 37; Ivan Balta, 
“Kolonizacija istočne Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest (2001), 
no. 2: 387-408, 399.
117 Ibid.:93-97.
118 Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. do 1966. 
godine, pp. 100, 110, 119.
119 Maticka, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1948., pp. 61, 83.
120 Ibid., 74.
121 Ibid., 117.
122 Maticka,“Hrvatsko seljaštvo i politika kolektivizacije (1945. – 1953.)”: 367, 370. 
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ants were oten recruited for temporary or even permanent job assignments in 
heavy industry or mining.123
Provisioning of the population and social circumstances
According to an estimate made by the Federal Croatian Government, in 
August 1945 approximately 90% of the population in the Croatian Littoral, 
Lika and Dalmatia was non-provisioned and starvation had set in. However, 
according to statements made by Vladimir Bakarić at the fourth session of the 
People’s Diet of Federal Croatia at the end of July 1945, nobody in Croatia had 
died of starvation.124
Great assistance in food was provided by wartime allies. Based on the 
American military’s AML Agreement with the People’s Liberation Army Su-
preme Command of 19 January 1945, 120,000 tons of goods were donated 
which were then distributed along the coastal belt.125 However, systematic aid 
was rendered as of March by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad-
ministration (UNRRA). Despite considerable problems pertaining to trans-
portation, Yugoslavia received more aid than any other European country. his 
aid beneitted 3 to 5 million people. Among other things, Yugoslavia received 
30,000 head of livestock, 3,500 tractors, 12,585 freight vehicles, 221 ships and 7 
tugboats, 264 locomotives and 864 rail-cars, one ield hospital with over 1,000 
beds, 31 ield hospitals with 200 beds and 129 ield hospitals with 40 beds.126
As of the autumn of 1945, the authorities directly organized the provi-
sioning of the population, which had already become accustomed to food ra-
tioning during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the NDH. hese measures in-
cluded mandatory purchase quotas for agricultural produce and the system of 
planned limited distribution of agricultural and industrial products. A system 
of remittances, vouchers, ration cards and tokens was introduced. he neces-
sary quantities for personal needs were precisely determined for peasants, and 
everything else had to be turned over to the state.127
123 Maticka, “Opskrba stanovništva u Hrvatskoj od 1945.do 1953. godine”, Zbornik Mirjane Gross 
u povodu 75 rođendana (Zagreb: Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu): 387-401, 388. 
124 Dokumenti Centralnih organa KPJ. NOR i revolucija (1941-1945), knjiga 22, (1. januar-4. 
mart 1945.), p. 193; Maticka, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1948., p. 65; 
Višnjić, Partizansko ljetovanje, p. 50.
125 Kardelj, Sećanja, p. 179.
126 Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, p. 237; John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice 
here was a Country, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2000), p. 239; Degan, Hrvat-
ska država u međunarodnoj zajednici, pp. 185, 186; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992, p. 169; 
Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1988. godine, p. 461; Kardelj, Sećanja, p. 179.
127 Maticka, “Opskrba stanovništva u Hrvatskoj od 1945.do 1953. godine”, p. 388, 389; Tomislav 
Jonjić, “Komunisti iz Hrvatske i hrvatska država”, Politički zatvorenik (2000): 99.
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he regime of planned distribution and consumption encompassed all 
items for nutritional needs, except for poultry, fruits and vegetables, textile 
goods and footwear, as well as all types of household needs. Such goods could 
not be purchased in legal commerce, i.e., outside of distribution channels. In 
July 1945, two types of citizen consumer booklets were introduced: general 
and supplemental, which were sub-divided into several categories based on 
the nature of the work an individual performed.128 In order for something to 
be purchased, three conditions had to be met: having the proper vouchers in 
the booklet/card, having money and the store actually having a supply of the 
desired items.129
Illegal resale, i.e., the black market and smuggling, was quite well devel-
oped. he government introduced draconian sanctions.130 However, shortages 
resulted in privileges for state and political leaders. Under conditions of general 
penury and shortages, in November 1945 state supply stores were introduced 
for the diplomatic corps and state representative bodies.131 In the summer of 
1945, the 1941 Partisan Memorial Medals were conferred, which brought with 
them privileges such as free medical care, the possibility of a one-month stay 
at thermal spas and transportation fare discounts.132
In Croatia until the winter of 1945/1946, 30,000 houses and 10,000 work 
facilities were rendered usable, and 1,310 schools were renovated or construct-
ed. Even so, the situation was exacerbated by the need to care for 32,263 war 
orphans registered in Croatia in 1946. here was additionally a high number 
of wartime disabled.133
he cities were crowded with refugees and oicials of the new authorities. 
Refugees had to return to their previous domiciles in which they had lived 
until 10 April 1941. In the irst months ater the entry of the Partisans in Za-
greb, 80,000 persons sought residence permits and assignment of housing.134 
Besides the seizure of housing units, the system of co-tenancy was also applied, 
whereby several families shared a single housing unit.135 Housing issues had 
already been regulated in 1945, when the right to allocate housing, i.e., the 
128 Maticka, Opskrba stanovništva u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1953. godine, p. 392. 
129 Kamberović, Prema modernom društvu, p. 123; Kardelj, Sećanja, pp. 128, 182; Bekić, Jugo-
slavija u hladnom ratu, p. 128; Maticka, “Opskrba stanovništva u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1953. 
godine”, p. 394.
130 R. J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and Ater (London and New York: 
Routledge, second edition, 1997), p. 252.
131 Maticka, “Opskrba stanovništva u Hrvatskoj od 1945.do 1953. godine”, p. 392. 
132 Nikolić, Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945. – 1985. Kadrovi i kadrovska politika, pp. 62, 172.
133 Statistički godišnjak FNRJ 1954, pp. 355, 358; Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda. Narodna fron-
ta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945. – 1952., pp. 177, 178, 201.
134 HDA, CK SKH, Zapisnik CK KPH, 25. 4. 1946;30 godina. Unutrašnji poslovi Zagreb, 18; Šime 
Đodan, Aktualni gospodarski položaj Zagreba, Kritika 13 (1970): 485-500, 489.
135 Lasić, Autobiografski zapisi, p. 374.
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assignment of housing units, was transferred to the people’s committees. At 
the time, rent in an amount of 50% of rents from 1939 was speciied, as well as 
social management of buildings with over three housing units. he owners of 
residential buildings were only entitled to 10% of the rent. Actually, in practice 
many housing units, buildings and commercial properties were usurped. Pri-
vate ownership only existed formally.136
he average loor space of a housing unit (apartment) in Yugoslavia in 
1945 was 41.2 m², and one housing unit was used by 4.6 persons. he situation 
in Croatia was negligibly higher than the Yugoslav average.137
In the payment system of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, clerical salaries were 
at a ratio of 1:12, and even 1:16, while the new authorities introduced ratios 
of 1:3.5, and 1:2.1 for labourers, which was a direct relection of the poor eco-
nomic situation and shortages, as well as the communist worldview which ac-
corded priority to equality over eiciency and merit-based advancement.138 
Payment based on function rather than qualiications predominated, which 
allowed for the appointment of unqualiied Party personnel.
Due to wartime destruction, in 1945 Yugoslavia was only working at 30% 
of capacity, and production did not reach pre-war levels.139 In Croatia there 
were 227,748 unemployed.140
Fear of intervention by the West due to Istria and Trieste prompted the 
authorities to adopt a cautious stance, so the military numbered 100,000 men. 
here were state agencies charged with recruiting the rural labour force for in-
dustrialization, and such bodies also functioned in enterprises. As a part of the 
People’s Front, youth organizations also established voluntary labour brigades. 
he authorities developed rather diverse methods to convince those who did 
not respond to summons for “voluntary” work: denial of guaranteed rations, 
increases in mandatory purchase quotas for produce, cutting of electricity and 
fuel oil and closure of train stations in settlements where the failure to volun-
teer was high, bans on milling lour and sales to the families of persons who 
did not volunteer for labour, and recruitment with the help of the police.141
136 Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. do 1966. 
godine, pp. 150, 153; Akmadža, Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945. – 1966., 
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cember 12, 2002.
137 Grga Jelinić, Kako riješiti stambenu krizu (Zagreb: AGM, 1994), pp. 15, 18.
138 Dušan Bilandžić, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: Glavni procesi 
1918-1985, 3. dopunjeno izdanje (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1985), pp. 115, 123.
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he new role of trade unions
By establishing a uniied organization, the communists took the trade 
union movement into their own hands. he union became a means of trans-
mission for the Party and a para-state organization. General interests, i.e., the 
interests of the people and state, were placed in the forefront, rather than the 
special interests of members. he priority was placed on production rather 
than the protection of workers. For example, the struggle to reduce work hours 
and the intensity of labour was abandoned. Moreover, the union was obliged 
to organize labour competitions, propose increased labour quotas and pre-
vent salary hikes. Its leadership most harshly condemned criticisms that the 
authorities were creating economic growth on the backs of workers. Given the 
increasing pressure on workers to increase the tempo of their labour, the au-
thorities explained these procedures by citing the great change in comparison 
to the capitalist Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It was asserted that workers were no 
longer working for capitalists, but rather for themselves, the working class and 
the people. his is why workers were encouraged to increase labour produc-
tivity by means of high quotas, and why there were campaigns to reduce the 
costs of production and labour campaigns named ater worthy workers, and 
non-work days, especially holidays, were changed into work days. All state and 
para-date organizations had to be engaged to achieve this.142
he role of the single trade union was clearly deined by Vladimir Bakarić, 
the political secretary of the Croatian Communist Party’s Central Committee, 
who, in the 14 July 1945 edition of the Party bulletin Naprijed, warned of the 
dangers concealed by continued insistence on its immutable nature. he union 
had to abandon its old standpoints ater the change in government. Many 
could not, obviously, understand this, and some even deliberately opposed this 
new role for the union:
he central question is production. Only with production, more produc-
tion and ever greater production can we beat back our enemies in this ma-
jor enterprise. he enemy is willing to concede ‘successes’ to us in all other 
ields, only to be able to inlict losses upon us in the this most important 
ield. Raising labour discipline, a combative stance in labour, disclosure of 
slipshod management in this regard – these are the main tasks of our trade 
union organizations, because the future of the working class in our country 
depends upon it.143
Not even Marko Belinić, the president of the Uniied Union of Workers 
and Civil Servants of Yugoslavia for Croatia, writing for the union bulletin 
Glas rada (Voice of Labour) on 1 January 1946, did not leave any doubt as to 
the new role of the union. He asserted that in the time of capitalism the strug-
142 Zdenko Radelić, Sindikat i radništvo u Hrvatskoj (1945.-1950.), pp. 135-160.
143 Ibid., p. 141.
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gle to reduce work hours and oppose the rationalization of labour were part 
of the struggle against exploitation, while “today”, in the time of the “people’s 
government”, such demands constitute hostile activity.144
Croatia, the federal system and national relations
In ZAVNOH documents, the name of the Croatian state is not deined. 
he names Croatia, Federal Croatia and Federal State of Croatia are all used.145 
In his initial speech upon the establishment of the government, Bakarić did 
not mention the Federal State of Croatia. In the law changing the name of the 
Territorial Antifascist People’s Council, “Democratic Croatia” is mentioned, 
and the Diet (Sabor) is referred to as the “People’s Diet of Croatia”. Many laws 
issued by the ZAVNOH Presidium mention Federal Croatia.146 his situation 
prevailed until the Diet’s Presidency passed the Peoples Republic of Croatia 
Act on 26 February 1946, and this name had already been speciied in the 
Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia ratiied on 31 Janu-
ary 1946.147
he federal system was an essential preference of the Communist Party 
of Croatia. It was emphasized that Yugoslavia was a federation of equal re-
publics and nations. For the federal system, the existence of territorial politi-
cal representative bodies and regional military headquarters was crucial.148 At 
the third session of the ZAVNOH in Topusko on 9 May 1944, a Declaration 
was adopted which stressed that the Croatian and Serbian peoples are equal in 
Croatia with equal rights.149
he renaming of the People’s Liberation Army (NOV) and the Partisan 
Detachments of Yugoslavia (POJ) into the Yugoslav Army (JA) on 1 March 
1945 and the dissolution of the central command stafs of the federal units 
also ended the federal armies. All units were subordinated to the command of 
the General Staf of the Yugoslav Army without intermediaries at the level of 
the federal units. he Command Staf of the Yugoslav Army for Croatia was 
abolished on 18 May 1945. On 10 August 1945, the Central Committee of the 
144 Ibid., p. 143.
145 Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske, Zbornik dokumenata 1944. 
(Od 1. siječnja do 9. svibnja) (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1970), pp. 591-672.
146 Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske, Zbornik dokumenata 1945. 
(Od 1. siječnja do 25. srpnja) (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1985) pp. 630, 631, 
650, 719.
147 Perić, Hrvatski državni sabor 1848. – 2000. Treći svezak: 1918. – 2000., pp. 177, 178.
148 Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, p. 74.
149 Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske, Zbornik dokumenata 1944. 
(Od 1. siječnja do 9. svibnja) (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1970), p. 666.
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Croatian Communist Party (KPH) already assumed leadership of the party 
organizations in the Yugoslav Army through the Political Section (Adminis-
tration) of the People’s Defence Ministry. he wartime independence of the 
federal units was thus entirely ended..150 Actually, there was no federalism, as 
all essential decisions were made by the Politburo of the Yugoslav Commu-
nist Party’s Central Committee. Even though the Politburo relected a virtually 
ideal ethnic structure, communist leaders did not act on behalf of nations or 
even republics.
he general regulation on the appointment of governments was prepared 
in Belgrade, by the AVNOJ Presidium on 31 March 1945. A general formula 
was adopted for the appointment of all governments, their names, the num-
ber of departments and their jurisdiction. he sole concession to federalism 
was that AVNOJ did not release its recommendations in the form of laws, but 
rather as just that, recommendations. he prime ministers in each government 
became secretaries in the Politburo. In Croatia that was Vladimir Bakarić. he 
federal government could rescind any republic regulation if they did not com-
ply with federal laws.151
Tito, in his speech delivered in Zagreb on 21 May 1945 (the irst and last 
time he declared his Croat ethnicity), said the federation would not be a set 
of small states, rather it would have more of an “administrative character”, but 
that the republics would have the freedom to administer themselves and that 
they would be independent in their cultural and economic development.152
Besides several articles in the opposition Narodni glas in Zagreb and De-
mokratija in Belgrade in 1945, only images of the unity of all republics and na-
tions were presented to the public, and any topic dealing with ethnic disputes 
was prohibited.153
In Croatia, the wartime rits could not be forgotten. According to approxi-
mate calculations, 65,600 NOV soldiers and 52,500 NDH soldiers had been 
killed. he fact that there were 174,402 soldiers in the NDH armed forces at the 
end of the war also impeded a normalization of the situation. he structure of 
arrested members of the Yugoslav Army in 1946 based on the grounds for their 
arrest is interesting. Out of this total of 1,104 members of the Yugoslav Army, 
1,324 were arrested for Ustasha or Home Guard sympathies, 532 for Chetnik 
150 Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, p. 226; Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, p. 
200; Matković, Povijest Jugoslavije, p. 287.
151 Vodušek Starić, Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946, pp. 213, 214.
152 Broz Tito, Izgradnja nove Jugoslavije, p. 14; Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National 
Question, p. 117; Aleksa Đilas, Osporena zemlja. Jugoslavenstvo i revolucija (Belgrade: Književne 
novine, 1990), p. 236.
153 Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1988. godine, p. 386; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992, 
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sympathies, and 279 for Slovenian Belogardist sympathies. he discrepancy is 
obvious, particularly when the share of Croats in the structure of population is 
compared to the respective shares of Serbs and Slovenes.154
If the situation in Croatia is considered, the share of Croats in the Partisans 
was a little over 60%, which was almost 15% less than their share in the struc-
ture of its population, while the share of Croatian Serbs was 28%, which was 
almost 70% more than their share in Croatia’s population structure.155 Even the 
Communist Party of Croatia had an imbalance in its ethnic structure. Areas 
with ethnically mixed populations had a much higher share of Serbs than in 
the comparison to the ethnic composition in this regard.
Table 2. Ethnic structure of the Communist Party of Croatia in 1945156
Ethnicity Beginning of 1945 June 1945 End of 1945
No. % No. % No. %
Croats 9,135 57.6 13,877 56,0 30,664 64.9
Serbs 6,257 39.5 10,159 41,0 14,509 30.7
Others 460 2.9 744 3.0 2,062 4.4
Total 15,852 100.0 24,780 100.0 47,235 100.0
In Lika, among the local communists, only 14.5% were Croats, even though 
their share in the local population was almost equal to that of the Serbs, and 
even higher in certain areas. Croats were a majority of the population in Bano-
vina, but among Party members the Croats only accounted for a 23.4% share. 
It was similar in Gorski Kotar, Kordun and Slavonia. Ater the war, the per-
centage of Croats in the Communist Party of Croatia grew, but in many areas 
this proceeded rather slowly. his is why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
established special commissions tasked with verifying the reasons for this situ-
154 Marijan F. Kranjc, Balkanski vojaški poligon: Kdo so glavni krivci za razbijanje Jugoslavije 
(varnosno-vojaški spisi), e – knjiga (Maribor: Založba Pro-Andy, 2008), p. 36; Žerjavić, Opsesije i 
megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga, p. 198; Josip Potočnjak, “Bleiburg”, Hrvatska ljevica, 30. 
6. 2001., 5-6, 34-35.
155 Igor Graovac, “O proučavanju struktura sudionika NOB-a i socijalističke revolucije u Hr-
vatskoj 1941-1945.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 1974., 2., 7-64, p. 62; Branko Dubravica, 
Vojska antifašističke Hrvatske (1041-1945) (Zagreb: Narodno sveučilište Velika Gorica, 1996), p. 
3; Ivetić, “Srbi u antifašističkoj borbi na područjima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, pp. 149-175, 
152-167; Ivo i Slavko Goldstein, “Srbi i Hrvati u narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Hrvatskoj”, 
Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac, ed., Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, 6, Zagreb, 5. – 7. listopada 
2001. (Zagreb, 2002): 247-267, 264.
156 Jelić, Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937-1945, p. 332; Berislav Jandrić, “Organizaciono 
stanje i struktura KPH od oslobođ|enja zemlje do kraja 1946. godine”, in: Oslobođenje Hrvat-
ske 1945. godine. Zbornik radova (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske, 
1986): 62-79, 72-77.
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ation.157 One of the reasons included a negative attitude toward Croats, about 
which there was discussion at sessions of the Central Committees of both the 
overall Yugoslav and Croatian Communist Parties, mostly in the summer of 
1945. he treatment of prisoners of war, discrimination in food rationing and 
many cases of reprisals testify to this.158
Data for the Yugoslav Army ater a wave of decommissioning in the sum-
mer of 1945 show that its ethnic composition did not entirely comply with 
proclaimed policies.159
Table 3. Ethnic composition of oicers at the end of 1945160
Ethnicity Percentage in JA % in pop. structure 
(1948 census)
Compared to pop. 
structure
Montenegrins 9.20 2.70 +6,5
Croats 22.72 23.99 -1.72
Macedonians 3.58 5.14 -1.56
Muslims 1.88 5.13 -3.25
Slovenes 9.71 8.97 +0.74
Serbs 50.97 41.51 +9.46
he ethnic structure of the victorious army, like membership in the Croa-
tian Communist Party, was dictated by the attitude toward the state frame-
work: for or against Yugoslavia. Among the Serbs the preference was much 
more clear: it was positive toward various notions of Yugoslavia, and very 
negative toward any independent Croatia. It is understandable that the over-
representation of Serbs at state and political posts, especially in areas with eth-
nically mixed populations, had a direct inluence on widespread convictions of 
the subordinate nature of the Croats.
157 Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945-7. jul 1948), pp. 610, 
611, 612.
158 HDA, CK SKH, Zapisnik CK KPH, 13. 1. 1946; Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog 
komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945-7. jul 1948), 68, p. 382. 
159 Mirsad D. Abazović, Kadrovski rat za BiH (1945-1991) (Sarajevo: Savez logoraša, CID - Cen-
tar za istraživanje i dokumentaciju, 1999), p. 9.
160 I assumed data on the ethnic structure of the Yugoslav Army from D. Nikolić and Encik-
lopedija Jugoslavije. It is unclear as to where Nikolić obtained data on the ethnic structure of 
Yugoslavia, given that they do not correspond to the irst oicial census of 1948. While the dif-
ference for other nationalities was minimal, for the Croats the percentage should be 23.99 and 
not 29.69. he share of Croats in the ethnic structure of military oicers in 1945 in comparison 
to the ethnic structure of population in 1948 is therefore larger than what the author cites. See: 
D. Nikolić, Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945. – 1985. Kadrovi i kadrovska politika, p. 37.
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Conclusion
he fundamental contours of 1945 which marked the end of the war were 
the collapse of the NDH, the establishment of Federal Democratic Croatia as 
a part of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and the seizure of authority by the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ)/Communist Party of Croatia (KPH). 
Ater the end of the war, the KPJ took all power into its own hands and created 
the essential prerequisites for the implementation of a thorough reorganiza-
tion of the society and the Yugoslav state in line with its revolutionary and 
federalist ideas and the conveyance of experiences from the USSR. Among 
the irst steps taken by the new authorities were the collective punishment of 
ethnic Germans, which corresponded to the vengeful mood of populations in 
those European states which sufered under the occupation of the Germans 
or their allies. Besides merciless retaliation against adherents of the NDH, op-
ponents of the KPJ, as well as large landowners, skilled tradesmen and fac-
tory owners, were also subject to mass persecution under the pretence of the 
struggle against fascists and collaborators with the occupying powers. he 
KPJ formed and led a political organization under the name People’s Front 
of Yugoslavia, which included sections of civic parties, including the Croa-
tian Peasant Party, ater replacing their old leadership by installing lower pro-
communist oicials, generally concealed members of the Communist Party. 
All social organizations, and besides the People’s Front the most important 
role was played by women’s, youth and trade union organizations, were tasked 
with the achievement of the communist program, which was presented to the 
public in the guise of a general popular program of the struggle for rule by the 
people, social justice and equality in ethnic relations. Parties that did not join 
the People’s Front or which contested the Communist Party’s leading role were 
annihilated. he very high percentages for the Peoples’ Front in the elections 
to the Constitutional Assembly of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
in November 1945 were achieved under undemocratic conditions. he KPJ 
maintained the essential elements of a civil society, such as a constitution, par-
liamentary institutions and elections, but gradually limited them, later even 
rejecting the multi-party parliamentary system with the reasoning that parties 
represent narrow interests of individual classes and that they encourage ethnic 
strife. By spreading fear through repression, in which a special role was played 
by the security/political police known as the People’s Protection Department 
(OZNa), intense propaganda in the media and schools, and surveillance of 
intellectual life, the KPJ ensured support for its electoral slate and, gradually 
for the cult of personality surrounding KPJ leaders, irst and foremost Josip 
Broz Tito. Ater quashing the guerrilla resistance by the so-called Crusaders 
and preventing the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) from becoming active, it 
was mostly churches, and the Catholic Church in particular, which threatened 
communist totalitarian rule and its philosophical and ideological monopoly. 
his is why the authorities excluded religion from public life. Besides impos-
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ing its political and ideological monopoly, the reasons for such policies by 
the KPJ should also be sought in eforts to bolster the stability of Croatia and 
Yugoslavia by suppressing ethnic and religious convictions, particularly due 
to the communist commitment to normalize everyday life, renew structures 
destroyed by the war, and develop industry and cities as rapidly as possible in 
order to reach and then surpass the level of highly-developed capitalist states.
Das Jahr 1945 in Kroatien
Zusammenfassung
Autor stellt grundlegende Merkmale des Jahres 1945 dar, das durch das 
Kriegsende, den Untergang des Unabhängigen Staates Kroatien (kroatisch: 
Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), die Gründung des Föderativen Staates 
Kroatien im Rahmen des Demokratischen Föderativen Jugoslawiens und die 
Machtübernahme seitens der Kommunistischen Partei Jugoslawiens/Kom-
munistischen Partei Kroatiens (KPJ/KPH – kroatisch: Komunistička partija 
Jugoslavije/ Hrvatske) gekennzeichnet wird. Die KPJ übernahm die Macht 
nach dem Ende des Krieges und schuf die notwendigen Voraussetzungen für 
grundlegende Umwandlung der Gesellschat und des jugoslawischen Staates 
im Einklang mit ihren revolutionären und föderalistischen Ideen sowie mit 
Übernahme der Erfahrungen der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken. 
Eine der ersten Maßnahmen der neuen Macht war kollektive Bestrafung der 
Deutschen, was mit der zur Rache neigenden Stimmung der Bevölkerung eu-
ropäischer Staaten korrespondierte, die unter deutscher Okkupation bzw. Ok-
kupation deutscher Verbündeten gelitten hatte. Einer rücksichtslosen Abrech-
nung wurden nicht nur Teilnehmer und Kollaborateure des NDH-Regimes un-
terworfen, sondern auch politische Gegner der KPJ, sowie Großgrundbesitzer, 
Handwerker und Fabrikanten wurden zu Opfern massenhater Verfolgungen, 
was alles unter der Maske des Kampfes gegen Faschisten und Kollaborateure 
der Besatzungstruppen durchgeführt wurde. Die KPJ organisierte und leitete 
eine politische Organisation unter dem Namen Volksfront (kroatisch: Narod-
na fronta, NF), die einige Teile der bürgerlichen Parteien in ihren Rahmen ein-
schloss, darunter auch Teile der Kroatischen Bauernpartei (kroatisch: Hrvats-
ka seljačka stranka, HSS), indem die KPJ vorhergehend statt der alten Führung 
die neuen früher niedriger rangierten prokommunistisch orientierten Funk-
tionäre installiert hatte, die in der Regel verborgene Mitglieder der KPJ ge-
wesen waren. Alle gesellschatlichen Organisationen – neben der NF spielten 
weibliche, jugendliche und gewerkschatliche Organisationen die Hauptrolle 
– hatten zur Aufgabe die Verwirklichung des kommunistischen Programms, 
was in der Öfentlichkeit durch das volksgemeinschatlichen Programm des 
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Kampfes um die Volksmacht, die Gesellschat der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und 
der gleichberechtigten Nationalverhältnisse verschleiert wurde. Die Parteien, 
die der NF nicht beigetreten waren oder die führende Rolle der KPJ bestritten 
hatten, wurden vernichtet. Sehr hohe Prozentsätze bei den Wahlen gewon-
nener Stimmen der NF wurden in nicht demokratischen Umständen erzielt. 
Die KPJ behielt allerdings wichtige Bestandteile der bürgerlichen Gesellschat 
wie Verfassung, parlamentarische Institutionen und Wahlen, beschränkte aber 
allmählich das Mehrparteien-Parlamentärsystem und später warf es gänzlich 
ab, unter dem Vorwand, dass die Parteien enge Interessen der besiegten Klas-
sen vertreten und nationale Auseinandersetzungen aufreizen. Indem sie die 
Angst durch Repression verbreitete, worin die Hauptrolle die sicherheitspoli-
tische Polizei – die Abteilung für die Schutz des Volkes (kroatisch: Odjeljenje 
za zaštitu naroda, Ozna) – spielte und durch eine intensive Propaganda mit-
tels staatlicher Medien und Schulen sowie durch Aufsicht des intellektuellen 
Lebens sicherte sich die KPJ die Unterstützung ihrer Wahlliste und allmählich 
auch Verehrung der Führer der KPJ, vor allem aber Josip Broz Titos, als Göt-
zen. Nachdem die Guerillaabwehr der sog. Kreuzer (kroatisch: križari) un-
terdrückt und die Wiederaktivierung der Kroatischen Bauernpartei vereitelt 
worden war, stellten die Kirchen, und vor allem die Katholische Kirche, eine 
Drohung gegenüber der kommunistischen totalitären Macht und ihrem Welt-
anschauungsmonopol dar. Deswegen versuchten die Behörden, die Religion 
aus dem öfentlichen Leben zurückzudrängen. Gründe für solche Politik der 
KPJ sind nicht nur im Auferlegen des eigenen politischen und ideologischen 
Monopols zu suchen, sondern auch in Versuchen der KPJ, durch Unterdrück-
ung von nationalen und religiösen Überzeugungen der Bevölkerung die Sta-
bilität Kroatiens und Jugoslawiens zu befestigen, und zwar vor allem wegen 
fester Entschlossenheit der Kommunisten, den Alltag so schnell als möglich zu 
normalisieren, im Krieg vernichtete Gebäuden zu renovieren, Industrie und 
Städte auszubauen, und auf diese Weise die stark entwickelten kapitalistischen 
Länder einzuholen und zu übertrefen.
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